

GRECO-LATIN RELATIONS ON THE EVE
OF THE BYZANTINE RESTORATION:
THE BATTLE OF PELAGONIA—1259

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I. THE ANTI-NICENE COALITION OF MICHAEL II OF EPIRUS,
MANFRED OF SICILY, AND WILLIAM OF ACHAIA

THE reconquest of Constantinople on July 25, 1261, by troops of Michael VIII Palaeologos, Emperor of Nicaea, restored the Byzantine Empire after fifty-seven years of Latin occupation. For the success of this event nothing was more important than Palaeologos' victory at Pelagonia in 1259. This battle crushed the powerful triple coalition of his arch-rival Michael II, Greek Despot of Epirus, and the latter's Latin allies King Manfred of Sicily and Prince William of Achaia. It freed Palaeologos from the menace of an attack from the west and thereby permitted him to devote his energies to the recovery of the imperial city, possession of which was essential for any real claim to the mantle of the old Byzantine Empire.

Nicaea and Epirus, rival states established by Greeks fleeing the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, were both striving to recover the Greek capital. While the Nicene Emperors John III Vatatzes (1222–1254) and Theodore II Lascaris (1254–1258) had stripped the Latin Empire of most of its Asiatic and European possessions, Michael II, Despot of Epirus, by 1258 had occupied former European territories of the Byzantine Empire which today constitute western Greece and Albania. The stage was thus set for a decisive encounter.

The Despot's Latin allies, Manfred, whose Norman ancestors had nourished designs against Byzantium, and William, whose family had played a leading role in the conquest of 1204 and who himself now aimed at conquering the rest of Byzantine Greece, were rulers of states long antagonistic to Epirus. It would be interesting to consider what forces brought all three rulers together in this unnatural Latin-Epirot alliance.¹ How could their clashing aims and ambitions be reconciled? General works have covered this period and a few brief articles have treated certain aspects of it, but no work has analyzed the larger problems involved in the coalition or discussed the entire battle itself. It is therefore the purpose of this article to discuss the formation of the alliance and its collapse at Pelagonia.

To understand these developments it is necessary briefly to describe prior circumstances. In opposition to papal interests,² Frederick II (d. 1250), Western Emperor and father of Manfred, and the Emperor John III

¹ K. Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, II (Leipzig, 1867) 283 (hereafter referred to as *Geschichte*), calls it an "unnatürliche Bundesbrüderschaft."

² Frederick in Italy against the Pope himself, and John against Latin Constantinople, a papal protectorate.

Vatatzes of Nicaea, had formed an alliance, which was sealed by the marriage of Vatatzes to the daughter of Frederick.³ Despite the appearance in Italy of certain Greek troops fighting for Frederick,⁴ no important military aid seems to have been exchanged. Nevertheless, the moral and political value of the association was considerable and did not fail to evoke the fulminations of the Papacy against its two heretical opponents.⁵ With the accession and brief reign of Frederick's son and successor Conrad (1250–1254), there was apparently no drastic change in Nicene-Staufen relations, despite the dispatch by the young king of an envoy to Vatatzes in 1253 to protest the granting of asylum to relatives of Manfred, Conrad's vicar in Sicily.⁶

Meanwhile Nicaea, following the reigns of Vatatzes and his son Theodore, was undergoing the revolution of 1258, which brought Michael VIII Palaeologos to the throne. This event, so disturbing internally, afforded an opportunity for Michael II to seize the European provinces of Nicaea and

³ For this marriage of the sexagenarian Vatatzes with the young Constance, called Anna by the Greeks, see G. Acropolites, *Historia*, ed. A. Heisenberg, I (Leipzig, 1903) 110 (cited hereafter as Acrop.); N. Gregoras, *Historia* (ed. Bonn, 1829) 45 (cited as Gregoras); T. Scutariotes, Ἀγωνίμων Σύνοψις χρονική, *Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi* (Paris, 1894) 405 (cited as Scutariotes); and Mathew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H. Luard (London, 1877), Rolls Series, IV, 299, 357. Also see the secondary accounts of W. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903) 321–329; A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1952) 528–529; R. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople” (unpublished thesis, Harvard University, 1947) 622–623; A. Gardner, *The Lascarids of Nicaea* (London, 1912) 168 ff.; A. Meliarakes, Ἱστορία τῆς Νικαίας καὶ τοῦ Δεσποτάτου τῆς Ἡπείρου 1204–1261 (Athens, 1898) 359 ff. (cited as *Nicaea*); and the recent article of S. Borsari, “Federico II e l'Oriente,” *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXIII (Naples, 1951) 279 ff.

⁴ See N. Festa, “Le Lettere di Federigo II,” *Archivio Storico Italiano*, XIII (1894) 18, where the aid of Pergamene soldiers is mentioned: τῶν καρτερικωτάτων Περγαμηνῶν. Also see *Annales Placentini Gibellini*, MGH SS, XVIII, 479, where troops sent by Vatatzes are mentioned as participating in 1238 at the siege of Brescia: “milites quoque . . . Vatacii Grecorum imperatoris.”

⁵ C. Hefele, *Histoire des Conciles*, ed. H. Leclercq, V, 2 (Paris, 1913) 1678; Mathew Paris, *op. cit.*, 453. See also the Greek letters of Frederick (he knew the language well) to Vatatzes inveighing against the Roman Church and praising that of the Greeks for its religio-political attitude. These have been published in Festa, *loc. cit.*, 1–34, and in A. Huillard-Bréholles, *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, VI, pt. ii (Paris, 1861) 684–686. Borsari, *op. cit.*, 284, points out that Vatatzes sent financial aid to Frederick, a fact which apparently has hitherto been overlooked. The evidence (which may well be accurate) is a passage in the work of the fifteenth-century humanist, P. Collenuccio, *Compendio de le Istorie del Regno di Napoli*, ed. Saviotti, I (Bari, 1929) 141. It states that after the conquest of Vittoria and resulting loss of the Staufen treasury, Frederick “ebbe una gran somma di denari i quali li mandò Carloianne Batacio suo genero.”

⁶ The envoy was Berthold von Hohenberg. On this see N. Festa, *Theodori Ducae Epistolae CCXVII* (Florence, 1898) 230–231; and the chronicle of Niccolò Jamsilla, *Historia de rebus gestis Frederici II, Imperatoris ejusque filiorum*, in *Cronisti e scrittori sincroni della dominazione normanna nel regno di Puglia e Sicilia*, ed. G. del Re, II (Naples, 1868) 117. This protection was presumably withdrawn. See Norden, *op. cit.*, 329.

to extend Epirot territory almost to Salonika.⁷ But the Despot knew that Palaeologos was a resourceful opponent, who would seek reprisals once his power was established.⁸ Eager therefore to crush Palaeologos before he could consolidate his position, the Despot apparently sought to create a powerful alliance with states sharing similar aims against Nicaea.⁹

For this he looked to the rulers of Sicily and Achaia. Manfred, after the death of his brother, had completed his hegemony over Sicily in defiance of papal wishes.¹⁰ Soon after, probably at the beginning of 1258, while Michael II was battling Nicene troops in Macedonia, Manfred apparently seized certain former Norman possessions of Epirus along the Adriatic coast. Evidence for this assumption is a Greek notarial document of Dyrrachium (the modern Durazzo), dated February 23, 1258, testifying that it was already Manfred's first year of seignury over territories surrounding Dyrrachium and Avlona.¹¹

On June 2, 1259,¹² at the time of Manfred's marriage to Helen, daughter

⁷ That is, up to the Vardar River. See G. Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis*, I (Bonn, 1835) 82, line 1 (hereafter cited as Pach.). Also see Gregoras, 71, line 10, and Acrop., 139–150. Michael II's success was partly due to the favorable disposition of the European Greek population which was partial to Epirus and looked upon Asiatic Nicaea as an interloper. See J. Pappadopoulos, *Théodore II Lascaris, Empereur de Nicée* (Paris, 1908) 119, and G. Finlay, *History of Greece from Its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time*, III (Oxford, 1877) 340, who emphasizes the national aversion of the Albanians and the Vallachians to the Nicene government at this time.

⁸ See Acrop., 145; Pach., 21, describes accusations made against Palaeologos some years before for supposedly intriguing with the Despot. The contemporary *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae et Lombardiae*, in *Muratori Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, ed. L. Botteghi, VIII, pt. 3 (Città di Castello, 1916) 47 (also known as *Annales S. Justiniae Patavini*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, XIX [Hanover, 1866] 181) characterizes Michael accurately as “sciens vir callidus et astutus,” one who realized that “labor improbus omnia vincit.”

⁹ Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 510, and E. Bertaux, “Les Français d'outre mer au temps des Hohenstaufen d'Italie,” *Revue historique*, LXXXV (1904) 240.

¹⁰ We know nothing about his relations with the Greek states at this time.

¹¹ F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Res Graecas Italasque Illustrantia*, III (Vienna, 1865) 239 ff.: ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐτυχούς κράτους τοῦ κραταιοῦ καὶ ἀγίου ἡμῶν αὐθέντου κυρίου Μαρμφρέδου . . . καὶ τῆς κυριότητος τῆς πόλεως Δυρραχίου, Βελεγράδου, Αὐλώνος, Σφηναρίτων [sic] λόφων καὶ τῶν ἐπικρατημάτων καὶ θεμάτων τῶν τοιούτων χωρῶν ἔτει πρώτῳ. Also published in L. de Thallóczy, C. Jireček, and E. de Sufflay, *Acta et Diplomata Res Albaniae Mediae Aetatis Illustrantia*, I (Vienna, 1913) no. 246. The territories mentioned here are Dyrrachium, Bellegrada, Avlona, the Sphinariza mountains, and the surrounding area. On this see J. Buchon, *Recherches historiques sur la principauté française de Morée et ses hautes baronnies*, I (Paris, 1845) 103–104; and M. Dendias, “Ἑλένη Ἀγγελίνα Δούκαινα Βασίλισσα Σικελίας καὶ Νεαπόλεως,” *Ἡπειρωτικά Χρονικά*, I (1926) 223 (hereafter cited as *Helen*). Dendias, 224, cites, as additional proof of Manfred's pre-marriage encroachment, a Venetian diploma authorizing the Frankish lord of Athens to accept fiefs from Manfred, presumably in Epirus. The document, as printed in G. Tafel and G. Thomas, *Urkunden zur Älteren Handels und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, III (Vienna, 1857) no. 342, p. 31, is dated September 1, 1259, too late to be applicable in this particular case. (See text and notes 12 and 13, *infra*.) Dendias, however, has changed the year from 1259 to 1258.

¹² On this date see *infra*, note 16.

of Michael II, it appears that the Despot not only legitimized this occupation of his lands but even made grants of additional territories. Lacking adequate data, we can only speculate on reasons for this action. It seems justifiable, however, to surmise that Michael II, contemplating an offensive against Nicaea and accepting that Manfred already possessed the territories by right of conquest, turned this *fait accompli* to his own ends by officially granting to Manfred these territories with others as Helen's dowry.¹³ Thus the Despot could avoid hostilities and at the same time gain an ally.

In view of the former alliance between Vatatzes and Frederick, the reversal of Sicilian policy toward Nicaea seems at first surprising.¹⁴ However, one must consider that conquest of the Byzantine Empire had been a traditional Norman aim for almost a century,¹⁵ and that Manfred was now in a strong enough position in Italy to discard his father's alliance and to look to those who could assist him in his ambitions for Balkan domination.

The sources provide little detail with respect to the creation of the Sicilian-Epirot alliance.¹⁶ Both Greek and Latin writers give hardly more than the simple facts of the marriage of Manfred to Helen, eldest daughter

¹³ The problem of dating Helen's dowry and its connection with the creation of the alliance is a controversial one. I have stated what appears to me the most convincing view, that of Dendias, *Helen*, 223 ff., whose research is the most recent and conclusive. His opinion, shared by Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 518, and J. Romanos, *Περὶ τοῦ Δεσποτάτου τῆς Ἡπείρου* (Corfu, 1898) 56, is that the territories were Manfred's by right of conquest *before* his marriage and alliance with Michael II. Cf. G. Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di Re Manfredi," *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, III (1878) 55–56. For a summary of the various views see Dendias, *Helen*, 223 ff. See also the more recent article of G. Valentini, "Vestigia di Manfredi di Hohenstaufen Re di Sicilia e Signore di 'Romania,'" *Numismatica* (1939) 3 ff. Regarding Manfred's dowry, however, this article contains no new material of importance.

¹⁴ On this see F. Schneider, "Eine Quelle für Manfreds Orientpolitik," *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXIV (Rome, 1932–33) 112. Cf. E. Jordan, *Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie* (Paris, 1909) 381.

¹⁵ Robert Guiscard, Bohemond, Roger II, and Henry VI had all pursued such a policy; and William II in 1185 actually had sacked Salonika. See Eustathius of Thessalonika, *De Thessalonika urbe a Latinis capta narratio Opuscula*, ed. G. Tafel (Frankfurt, 1832) 267 ff.; also Tafel, *Komnenen und Normannen* (Stuttgart, 1870) 73–202; and Norden, *op. cit.*, 114–117.

¹⁶ The source for the date and place of the marriage is the chronicle of the contemporary Anonymous of Trani. Written in the Pugliese dialect, it states that the marriage took place at Trani (an Italian town opposite Dyrrachium) on June 2, 1259: "a lo di deide lu messe de junio de ipso anno 1259." Discovered by F. Davanzati in a Dominican convent at Trani, it was first published by him in his *Dissertazione sulla seconda moglie del re Manfredi e su' loro figliuoli* (Naples, 1791) 11 ff. The chronicle was considered a forgery of Davanzati by J. Ficker, "Manfreds zweite Heirath und der Anonymus von Trani," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung*, III (1882) 358–368. However, it is considered authentic by most historians including Dendias, Del Giudice, Meliarakes, and the present writer. For an analysis and answer to Ficker's argument, see Dendias, *Helen*, 237 ff. Fragments of the *Anonymous Chronicle* have been published by C. Minieri Riccio, *Alcuni Studii storici intorno a Manfredi e Corradino* (Naples, 1850). Although Davanzati's work is, to my knowledge, unavailable in America, I was able to use it in the Archivio di Stato of Naples, Italy.

of the Despot. It would be of interest, however, to know who took the initiative to promote the marriage alliance; whether Manfred's marriage preceded that of William of Achaia to Anna, another daughter of Michael II;¹⁷ and, most important, whether Manfred's Epirot possessions were secured from Michael II actually as a result of conquest or as a dowry. For these questions there is no definite evidence, and we must content ourselves with hypotheses based on a few hints provided by the sources concerning the motives and ambitions of each member of the coalition.

(a) *The motives of Michael II.* If one examines the dotal territories of Manfred, both those whose previous possession was now confirmed and those added by Michael II,¹⁸ it is obvious that they constituted certain of the most strategic areas of the Despotate of Epirus, a kind of extension of the Kingdom of Sicily on the Albanian coast.¹⁹ Clearly the master of these lands would be in position to begin the conquest of the Balkan peninsula.²⁰ For such concessions, it is logical to assume that Michael II expected substantial advantages from the alliance. Now the only territories surpassing these in value were Salonika or Constantinople, and there is good reason to believe that the Despot hoped, with the help of his allies, to carry out designs against these cities. Clear reference to this is Pachymeres' statement that it was the plan of the Despot "to gather together as many troops as possible to attack and try to capture it [Constantinople], and then to be

¹⁷ Dendias, *Helen*, 243–244, adduces two passages from Acropolites, 157, lines 22–23, and 164, lines 3–6, as evidence that Manfred's marriage preceded that of William.

¹⁸ That Michael II added other territories to the dowry can be assumed from the fact that the above-cited document of February 23 (see note 11) explicitly omits Corfu, Butrinto, and Sybonto, which, together with Dyrrachium, Bellegrada, Kanina, Avlona, and the Sphinariza mountains were included in the complete dowry. See the fourteenth-century work of M. Sanudo Torsello, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, in C. Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin, 1873) 107: ". . . dato in Dote Durazzo e la Vallona e Corfù. . ." Also Thallóczy, Jireček, and Sufflay, *op. cit.*, no. 245, who list the complete dowry territories. These editors, however, although accepting the date of the Anonymous (June 2, 1259) as the correct marriage date, propose a date *before* February of 1258 as the date of betrothal. This suggestion is presumably in order to show that Manfred's Epirot territories were secured as a result of dowry and not usurpation. But their argument fails to answer the fundamental question: Why should Michael II relinquish to Manfred, ruler of a realm traditionally inimical to Epirus, what were so obviously the most important parts of his lands? The most reasonable answer, I believe, is the one propounded in this work, that he wanted Manfred's aid in order to carry out his designs against Nicaea and Constantinople. If one admits that the Despot added further territories to the dowry, it seems clear that one must also concede that Manfred already possessed areas in Epirus before his marriage. Michael II was constrained to add to these in order to insure Manfred's alliance.

¹⁹ Bertaux, *loc. cit.*, 240.

²⁰ Dyrrachium was the key to the Byzantine Empire in the west, for that city and Avlona were the Adriatic termini of the Via Egnatia which led directly to Salonika. It had been Norman policy to gain control of this route. See G. Tafel, *De via Romanorum militari Egnatia* (Tuebingen, 1842) *passim*.

proclaimed Emperor of the Romans, for there was no one [thought the Despot], either of Lascarid or of any other family, worthier of the Empire than the Angeloi.”²¹ Pachymeres reemphasizes this point with the remark that Michael II, “after assembling the men of his allies and as many of his own men as possible, planned first to attack the generals of Nicaea and then . . . to assault Salonika and to overrun the west, after which . . . to make an attempt on Constantinople itself.”²² Probably a reference to the same objectives is Acropolites’ statement that the Epirot “meditated grandiose ideas and talked of excessive gains.”²³

According to J. Pappadopoulos, the Despot’s purpose in forming the alliance was merely to guarantee his newly conquered possessions in Macedonia against attack from Nicaea.²⁴ It is extremely doubtful, however, that the astute Michael II²⁵ would risk calling into his territory the forces of two Latin princes potentially more dangerous than Palaeologos, without contemplating advantages sufficient to compensate for the risk. Very probably among other considerations, the Angelos drew Manfred into an alliance to forestall a revival of the Staufen-Nicene combination which could crush him between them. We shall, in fact, see that Palaeologos did send an embassy to Manfred.

If Michael II’s ultimate aim was the capture of Constantinople, his more immediate one was Salonika, western metropolis of the Nicene Empire.²⁶ This was a realizable and legitimate objective since Epirot territory now extended to its very gates, and particularly since Salonika had been the capital of an ephemeral empire established in 1224 by the Despot’s uncle, the self-styled Emperor Theodore Ducas Angelos.²⁷ Supported by his allies and fortified by claims to his uncle’s inheritance, the Despot then had reason to believe that Salonika would soon be his.

Particularly important in Michael II’s plans for conquest was the military aid of William of Achaia’s Frankish chivalry, whose prowess was so

²¹ 82, lines 16–20. The next to the last phrase refers, of course, to the Lascarids and Palaeologoi of Nicaea.

²² Pach., 83, lines 14–19.

²³ 164: *μεγάλα ἐφρόνει καὶ ὑπερόγκα διελέγετο*.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, 122.

²⁵ Dendias, *Helen*, 260, with justice calls him *πολυμήχανος*, the epithet used by Homer of Odysseus.

²⁶ Pach., 83, line 17; cf. Norden, *op. cit.*, 332.

²⁷ Theodore had captured Salonika from the Latins in 1224, a date generally cited wrongly as 1222 or 1223. J. Longnon, “La Reprise de Salonique par les Grecs en 1224,” *Actes du VI^e Congrès International d’Études Byzantines*, I (Paris, 1950) 141 ff. (kindly presented to me by the author), conclusively demonstrates by the use of papal letters that the correct date should be 1224. Cf. W. Miller, “Salonika,” *English Historical Review*, 32 (1917) 169, and note 17.

celebrated that its fame had spread even to France.²⁸ But how Michael intended to rid himself of this formidable ally once victory had been secured is not disclosed.

(b) *The motives of Manfred*. As noted, Manfred possessed almost the entire littoral of Albanian Epirus even before his marriage. One indication that he was keenly interested in this territory and wanted to play a larger role in Balkan affairs is a document of June 17, 1258, revealing that he had sent a strong fleet of one hundred galleys under his Admiral Chinardo "ad partes Romaniae . . . ad provinciam Macedoniae" perhaps to support Michael II against the Nicenes.²⁹ F. Schneider, in a brief article successfully demonstrating the falseness of another part of this document (which purports to show that this expedition accomplished the *translatio* of the body of the Apostle Thomas from Edessa, Greece, to Italy), also impugns the veracity of this passage.³⁰ So far as can be determined, not a single Latin or Greek account confirms the tantalizing suggestion of an encounter at this time between Sicilian and Nicene forces. This is substantiated by the fact that Dyrrachium³¹ and Avlona, principal Adriatic ports and most likely points of contact, according to the sources, witnessed no collision between the two.³² We may therefore accept Schneider's conclusion that no such elaborate expedition took place and abandon what has hitherto been considered impor-

²⁸ Ramon Muntaner (*Chronik des Edlen en Ramon Muntaner*, ed. K. Lanz [Stuttgart, 1844] 468), the Catalan chronicler who was in Greece at the beginning of the fourteenth century, wrote that "la pus gentil cavalleria del mon era de la Morea." This in fact was later, during the period of Achaia's decline. On the Achaian knighthood in general see W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908) 109.

²⁹ B. Capasso, *Historia diplomatica regni Siciliae* (Naples, 1874) 145-146: "Tempore Manfredi principis Tarentini a. 1 regni sui sub anno 1258 17 m. junii . . . ad partes Romaniae galeae centum suo stolio navigante sub conductura Philippi Lenardi [*sic*] ejusdem regis ammirati, ad provinciam Macedoniae nautae vento prospero navigarunt . . . adventum cujus stolii civ. Edessae populus postquam scivit. . ." Cf. Romanos, *op. cit.*, 56, who mistakenly cites the date as July 17.

³⁰ "Eine Quelle für Manfreds Orientpolitik," *Quellen und Forschungen*, XXIV (Rome, 1932-33) 112-123. He proves that the translation of the bones of the Apostle Thomas brought from Edessa (another name for Vodena) in Macedonia to Italy, was a pious fraud; that this Edessa was confused with the city on the Upper Euphrates; that the one hundred galleys mentioned in this document were a gross exaggeration (this was first suspected by W. Cohn, "Die Geschichte der Sizilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Konrads IV. und Manfreds," *Abhandlungen zur Verkehrs und Seegeschichte*, IX [Berlin, 1920] 22); and that the Macedonia mentioned was not even situated along the seacoast. He concedes, nevertheless, that the term might have been used to apply to northern Greece in general, and thus would have included northern Epirus.

³¹ Dyrrachium was the medieval Greek name for the modern Durazzo (Albanian, Durrës).

³² See Acrop., 132 and 140. Also Pappadopoulos, *op. cit.*, 123, note 1. Dyrrachium had been seized from the Despot by Manfred at the end of 1257 or beginning of 1258. Michael II in turn had taken it from Nicaea, which had previously captured it from the same Despot by treason in 1257.

tant evidence for the policy of Manfred in the eastern Mediterranean.³³ Nevertheless, we relinquish this passage unwillingly, for it is clear that an expedition of this kind, if reported in less suspect fashion, would have accorded well with the Balkan aspirations of Manfred.

Dendias' suggestion that Manfred, content with his Epirot fortresses, furnished aid to his father-in-law merely at the request of his wife is to be questioned.³⁴ It seems more realistic to suppose that, in imitation of his Norman predecessors, he contemplated using Epirus as a springboard for further conquests. Thus, according to Gregoras, the objective of Manfred and William was the seizure "of all Greek territories from the Ionian [Adriatic] Sea to Constantinople without effort."³⁵ Norden supposes that Manfred was seeking a kingdom on the Adriatic in return for which he would have permitted his father-in-law to have Constantinople,³⁶ and in this connection Buchon and Dendias believe that Manfred expected and was promised Epirot territory for his aid.³⁷ Another theory is offered by Dendias, who suggests that Manfred sought the Epirot territories of his dowry as a refuge in case of his defeat by the Pope.³⁸ But Manfred's ascendancy in Italy at this time renders this view improbable.³⁹

The aims of Manfred, at least for the present, very possibly included

³³ Cf. Cohn, *loc. cit.*, 22. He accepts the correctness of Capasso's passage (as do Norden, *op. cit.*, 331; Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 519; and others) and therefore the actuality of the expedition. But he does state that one hundred ships is an exaggeration, since the Sicilian fleet, even in its heyday, never put to sea with such a large number of ships. G. Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di Re Manfredi," 30, note, wishes to change the date of the fleet expedition to 1259, and to associate it with Pachymeres' statement (see *infra*, note 105) that Manfred sent 3,000 troops to Greece to aid Michael II at Pelagonia. However, besides the fact that Manfred actually sent only 400 men to the Despot instead of 3,000, Del Giudice's change of date neglects to explain the huge number of a hundred ships, which, significantly enough, no Byzantine source corroborates.

³⁴ Dendias, *Helen*, 224.

³⁵ Gregoras, 72: καὶ γὰρ τὴν μετὰ τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον εὐθὺς ἄχρι Βυζαντίου πᾶσαν Ῥωμαίων ἀρχὴν ἤλπισαν ἔξειν ἀπονητί.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, 333-334. Cf. Valentini, "Vestigia di Manfredi . . ." 65, who cites as evidence of Manfred's aspiration to Byzantine territory two coins inscribed "Manfridus. R. Siciliae . . . et Dominus Romanie."

³⁷ Dendias, *Helen*, 277; Buchon, *Recherches historiques*, 279. On this point the sources are not specific.

³⁸ *Helen*, 235.

³⁹ Furthermore, Manfred was not such a defeatist as to be considering expulsion from Italy. It is only fairly recently that the true character of Manfred, that of a bold, handsome, extremely capable ruler, has been rehabilitated from the calumny cast upon it by his fanatical Guelf opponents, who in derision called him the "Sultan of Lucera." To his Sicilian subjects he was the "new Titus," a tribute both to his character and to the love they bore for him. See Dendias, *Helen*, 229 ff., and *Cambridge Medieval History*, VI (Cambridge, 1929), 184. For additional information on Manfred's character and career see A. Karst, *Geschichte Manfreds* (Berlin, 1897); F. Schirmacher, *Die letzten Hohenstaufen* (Göttingen, 1871) 69-298; and K. Hampe, *Urban IV. und Manfred* (Heidelberg, 1905).

aid for Michael II in capturing Constantinople, or perhaps even a joint occupation of that city. According to Pachymeres, its capture on land would be rendered easier by the use of Manfred's excellent German troops, eager to fight papal forces as they had previously done under his father Frederick.⁴⁰ Of further help in assaulting Constantinople, whose chief defense was the Venetian fleet, could be the Sicilian navy. Although there is no evidence to prove contemplation of Staufen naval aid, it seems certain that the Sicilian marine loomed large in any plans of Manfred for conquest in the Balkans.⁴¹ (At this point one cannot but recall the naval expedition of Manfred mentioned above.) As for Manfred's ambitions on Constantinople, we may be sure that he never relinquished such aspirations. Evidence for this is an incident occurring in 1264, several years after the dissolution of the alliance under consideration, whereby the Genoese Podestà Guercio attempted to hand over Constantinople to Manfred.⁴²

Finally, it is important that any consideration of Manfred's motives for entering this coalition should be related to his basic and permanent aims — papal recognition of his Sicilian hegemony, and Staufen domination of all Italy. In this respect a successful Greek policy on his part could presumably exert considerable influence on Italian affairs, particularly on the Papacy, the real protector of the Latin states of Greece.⁴³

(c) *The motives of William of Achaia: the role of Baldwin.* The reasons for adherence to the coalition of the third confederate, William II Villehardouin, Prince of Achaia,⁴⁴ are more complex and hypothetical. With respect to his aims there is only one statement in the Byzantine historians, that of Acropolites, who writes vaguely that William could expect to gain considerably from the alliance.⁴⁵ It is likely that William supposed that with Michael II's support he could completely surround and subdue the recalci-

⁴⁰ Pach., 83: *πειραθῆναι Κωνσταντινουπόλεως . . . εὐκοιρον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο οἱ ξυνέπιπτεν ἐξ αἰτίας τῆς ὅτι καὶ ὁ Μαμφρέ παρὰ πατρὸς Φερδερίχου ὡς κληρὸν τινα εἶχε τὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀποστατεῖν, ὥστε μὴ ξένον εἶναι τὸ Γερμανοὺς τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἰταλοῖς μάχεσθαι.*

⁴¹ Constantinople had never fallen to an enemy attacking by land. Its only capture, that of 1204, was by sea.

⁴² On this see *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori*, ed. C. Imperiale, IV (Rome, 1926) 65.

⁴³ Norden, *op. cit.*, 333–334.

⁴⁴ William's uncle had helped to found the principality of Achaia shortly after the Latin conquest in 1204. For the use of the words "Peloponnesus," "Morea," and "Achaia," used apparently interchangeably in the sources, see, for example, Gregoras, 75: ὁ πρίγκιψ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Ἀχαΐας; Pach., 82: τὸν πρίγκιπα τῆς Ἀχαΐας; and P. Kalonaros' recent edition of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* (Τὸ Χρονικὸν τοῦ Μορέως [Athens, 1940]) line 4277: τὸν τόπον τοῦ Μορέως. Kalonaros shows that in the *Chronicle* the word "Morea" sometimes refers only to the northwest part of the Peloponnesus, that is, to territory around the plain of Elis. See *op. cit.*, esp. note to line 1447.

⁴⁵ 165: καὶ πολλὰ ἐκ τούτου προσγενήσεσθαι αὐτῷ προσδοκῶν. . .

trant Frankish barons of Middle Greece.⁴⁶ No doubt he could, at the very least, consolidate the allegiance of his Greek archons of Achaia (as in fact was revealed by their willing coöperation at Pelagonia), since, as W. Miller reasonably believes, they would naturally favor an alliance with their fellow Greeks of Epirus.⁴⁷ Lastly, he could gain important allies against Palaeologos, whose intention, it was becoming increasingly clear, was the restoration of former Byzantine territories at the expense of the Franks of Greece.⁴⁸

Marino Sanudo, the fourteenth-century Venetian chronicler,⁴⁹ while emphasizing the Prince's aspirations ("Who can judge the limits of this Villehardouin's ambition?"), suggests that he wished to conquer Constantinople on land and to displace the Venetians of that city in revenge for their support of the rebellious triarchs of Negropont.⁵⁰ Norden accepts this suggestion with its implication that William planned to become high suzerain over all of Latin Greece.⁵¹ But this seems unlikely, since William would first have had to dispossess the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin, whose vassal he was.⁵² Such a *démarche*, of course, would involve William in serious difficulties with Baldwin's protector, the Papacy. Besides this, William was apparently not on unfriendly terms with Baldwin, as is revealed by their association on the crusade to Damietta in 1250.⁵³ In sum,

⁴⁶ Hopf, *Geschichte*, 280. For his conflicts with the Dukes of Athens and the triarchs of Negropont, see J. B. Bury, "The Lombards and Venetians in Euboea (1205-1303)," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, VII (London, 1886) 309 ff.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, 109.

⁴⁸ This was shown after the battle of Pelagonia when Palaeologos demanded the Morea from Villehardouin, his prisoner. See Pach., 87-88; also 206, line 18, where, according to the historian, John Palaeologos later demanded territory from Michael II of Epirus in the name of his brother Michael as formerly belonging to the Byzantine Empire: *ὡς πάλαι τῇ βασιλείᾳ προσήκουσαν*. The *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae*, RISS, VIII, pt. 3, 47 (*Annales S. Justiniae Patavini*, 181), records that Michael Palaeologos believed "Constantinopoli acquisita, omnes maris insulas et civitates in terra firma constitutas, a Latinis et Venetis maxime iure belli possessas, se breviter habiturum."

⁴⁹ His *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, composed between 1328 and 1341, was written originally in a Latin version which has been lost. Only an Italian version survives. It is the best source for Moreot history after the documents. See J. Longnon, ed., *Chronique de Morée* (Paris, 1911) p. xix. Sanudo's history is published in C. Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin, 1873) 99 ff.

⁵⁰ Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107, ". . . credo andasse per assaltar li Veneziani che erano ivi [in Constantinople], e vendicarsi di loro, che li tenivan Negroponte."

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, 332.

⁵² Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107: "potria esser, che andasse per servir all' Imperator Latino, a cui era obbligato di Fedeltà e dal qual reconoscea le Terre della Morea che aveva." Hopf, *Geschichte*, 282, finds it difficult to believe that William planned to dispossess Baldwin.

⁵³ Geoffrey Villehardouin, William's brother, had dispatched aid to Latin Constantinople in 1236 at the time it was besieged by Vatatzes and Asen, the Bulgar King. See Ph. Mouskes, *Chronique Rimée*, ed. de Reiffenberg (Brussels, 1836-1838), II, 620. On the crusade to Damietta see Joinville, *op. cit.*, ed. de Wailly, no. 427.

though it is not impossible that Sanudo reports correctly that William wished to harass, even to dispossess, his hated rivals, the Venetians, it seems too much to accept Norden's view that William planned to replace Baldwin on the throne of Constantinople.⁵⁴

A much more likely objective on William's part would have been the acquisition of Salonika. His designs on that city are exposed in the *Chronicle of the Morea*. At the time of the Latin conquest, there had been established at Salonika an ephemeral Lombard kingdom, and William may have aspired to revive that realm with himself as its ruler.⁵⁵

It would be instructive at this point to consider the dowry received by William at his marriage to Anna, daughter of Michael II. Provided with no particulars by the Byzantine historians, we must consult two other sources, the Greek version of the *Chronicle of the Morea*⁵⁶ and the *Istoria del Regno di Romania* of Marino Sanudo. According to the former, at the marriage which took place in Patras, sixty thousand *hyperperi* were bestowed on William by Michael II as dowry.⁵⁷ Territorial concessions are also listed by Sanudo, comprising the castle of Likonia and *alcune altre terre*.⁵⁸ Likonia, situated in Thessaly close to Demetrias on the Gulf of Volos,⁵⁹ did not border on William's Achaia, and therefore to reach it one had to traverse the Duchy of Athens-Thebes or to cross entirely by sea. That the Despot did not grant William territory in nearby southern Epirus was in all likelihood intentional; he apparently did not want William to secure a foothold there, whence he could easily launch an attack against the Epirots and perhaps come into closer contact with Manfred.

⁵⁴ It must not be forgotten that Sanudo's Venetian bias could have caused him to attribute exaggerated designs to her enemy.

⁵⁵ On William's aspirations to Salonika see the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*, ed. Kalonaros, line 3653, which reads that William and the Despot planned to seize Salonika: *νὰ ἐπάρωμεν τὰ μέρη Σαλονίκης*. Also the Aragonese version, *Libro de los Fechos*, ed. A. Morel-Fatio (Geneva, 1885) par. 250, which records the Despot as saying to Prince William: ". . . vos aures el realme de Salonich." See also Miller, *op. cit.*, 109: "William may well have aspired to receive the Lombard Kingdom of Salonika and rule from Macedonia to Matapan."

⁵⁶ For an analysis of the historical importance of all versions of the *Chronicle of the Morea* see J. Longnon, ed., *Chronique de Morée* (Paris, 1911) pp. xxi-lxxxvii. Although the most recent and best edition of the Greek version is that of P. Kalonaros, *op. cit.*, the older edition of J. Schmitt, *The Chronicle of the Morea* (London, 1904), is still not without value.

⁵⁷ Ed. Kalonaros, *op. cit.*, line 3127: *χιλιάδες ἐξόντα ὑπέρπυρα ἦτον γὰρ τὸ προικίον*. The amount is not stated in the French version. See J. Longnon, "Le Rattachement de la Principauté de Morée," *Journal des Savants* (1942) 136, note 1, who notes that 1,000 *hyperperi* were equivalent at this time to the revenue from one knight's fief.

⁵⁸ *Istoria*, 107: "il Castello della Liconia e alcune altre Terre." Cf. also Hopf, *Geschichte*, 282, and Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 521.

⁵⁹ See F. Stählen, *Pagasai und Demetrias* (Berlin, 1934) 221, and the attached map, which omits Likonia, although including Demetrias and its environs. Stählen says that Likonia was not separated from Michael II's Thessalian territory. He cites no source, however.

The problem of the location of this dotal territory is complicated, involving among other things questions of ethnology and hegemony in Thessaly. That area, populated largely by Vlachs – a people whose origin has been long debated⁶⁰ – was apparently only in part ruled by Michael II, the rest being under the jurisdiction of his son John, called the Bastard, and of such Vlach chieftains as John's father-in-law, Taron.⁶¹

J. Longnon attempts to identify the dowry territory listed by Sanudo with certain territories mentioned in a recently discovered treaty whose signatories were William of Achaia and Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily. In this treaty, signed in 1267 only a few years after William's marriage, it is stated that at the time of the marriage, territories were granted to William by Baldwin, Latin Emperor of Constantinople.⁶² Even more striking than the reference to additional territories is the interpolation of the name of the Emperor Baldwin. One immediately wonders what role, if any, Baldwin played in the affairs of the coalition under discussion.

In the final analysis, the fate of Constantinople was involved in the alliance against Nicaea, and it is hardly likely that Baldwin sat quietly awaiting the course of events. Although no source mentions anything of his participation in the coalition, it is unlikely that the allies did not at least consider the advantages to be gained (especially of having a closer base for attacking Nicaea)⁶³ if Baldwin could be drawn to their side. Indeed, Del Giudice suggests, but without adducing evidence, that at the time of

⁶⁰ On this thorny problem of the origin of the Vlachs (who are most probably Rumanians), see R. Wolff, "The 'Second Bulgarian Empire.' Its Origin and History to 1204," *Speculum*, XXIV (1949) 203. It is the opinion of Pachymeres, 83, line 10, that the Megalovlachs were descended from the ancient Hellenes of Achilles!

⁶¹ Pach., 83, line 6: εἶχε δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐκ νοθείας υἱὸν Ἰωάννην . . . τῇ τοῦ Ταρωνᾶ θυγατρὶ συνών. Also Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107: ". . . Signor de la Parte, d'Odrich e finalmente della Blachia"; and Hopf, *Geschichte*, 281. The Vlachs delighted in Old Testament names; hence, "Taron." The name perhaps results from a conflation of the words τοῦ and Ἀαρὼν (not from τὸν and Ἀαρὼν, which would probably produce Ναρόν), or simply from the Armenian name, Taron.

⁶² J. Longnon, "Le Rattachement de la Principauté de Morée au Royaume de Sicile en 1267," *Journal des Savants* (1942) 134 ff. Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily, and Baldwin, now only the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople, in Viterbo on May 29, 1267, concluded a treaty whereby Baldwin would cede to Charles suzerainty over the Morea in return for military aid in recapturing Constantinople from Palaeologos. The cession of the Morea was spoken of only in generalities, and precise details were unknown until J. Longnon discovered a hitherto unknown treaty in Dossier B366 of the *Archives des Bouches-du-Rhône* published by Blancard. This treaty had been drawn up between the same parties on May 24, 1267, a few days before the above-mentioned treaty. According to the terms of the newly discovered convention, the Morea was to be retained by William until his death, at which time it would be ceded to Charles, whose son was meanwhile to marry William's daughter. The clause regarding Baldwin's territorial gift to William reads: "terra nobis [William] post ipsum matrimonium contractum a predicto imperatore donata." See Longnon, *loc. cit.*, 142, note 1.

⁶³ Constantinople was only about eighty miles from Nicaea.

William's marriage, an alliance was probably signed by Manfred, William, Michael II, and Baldwin.⁶⁴

Such a statement is highly improbable. In the first place, for Baldwin to admit the allied army into his territory would have endangered his already enfeebled position⁶⁵ and permitted the coalition forces, if they so desired, to take his possessions with a minimum of effort. Furthermore, even granted an allied conquest of Constantinople, it would have been very difficult for the allies to agree on a division of Baldwin's territories. No doubt Baldwin was aware of the confederate designs and probably hoped for a long war to exhaust not only their strength but that of their mutual enemy Nicaea.

In view of his anxieties, it would not be surprising if Baldwin, in order to create good will between himself and the powerful, ambitious William of Achaia, actually did grant to the latter at the time of his marriage some sort of territorial gift. Baldwin was, nominally at least, high suzerain of Latin Greece, and in that capacity a gift from him to a vassal would not be unusual. But Baldwin's critical position, both political and financial, would have precluded a gift of imperial territory. It is therefore likely that the territorial gift mentioned in Longnon's newly found treaty refers rather to a grant of lands located outside the Latin Empire, territory possibly to be conquered by William in the future, and which Baldwin might have given him in advance as high suzerain of all of Latin Greece. A theory similar to this is suggested by Longnon himself, who believes that this territory might have been located somewhere in northern Greece.⁶⁶

In view of these considerations, which could not but have been apparent

⁶⁴ Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di Re Manfredi," *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, III (1878) 17: "E col matrimonio [of Manfred and Helen] un trattato di alleanza offensivo e difensivo dovette essere formato tra il figliuolo di Federico, il Villarduino, il Despota Greco e l'Imperatore di Costantinopoli." A second edition of this work is inaccessible to me.

⁶⁵ Baldwin's empire had been reduced practically to the city of Constantinople and its surrounding territory. He had been forced to make frequent journeys to the West to seek aid personally and even to raise funds by selling the lead from the roofs of palaces of Constantinople. On this see M. Sanudo, *Fragmentum*, in Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin, 1873) 170: "vendidit et distribuit quasi totum quod habebat in Constantinopoli, discooperiendo palatia plumbea et vendendo." See in addition a hitherto unused passage from Scutariotes, *op. cit.*, 508-509, which probably refers to Baldwin's removal of lead from the church roofs: τῶν τότε αὐτῆς ἀρχόντων Ἰταλῶν πολλὰς τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐκκλησιῶν βουλευσαμένων καταστρέψαι πρὸς θεραπείαν τῆς ἐνούσης ἐνδείας αὐτοῖς . . .

⁶⁶ *Loc. cit.*, 142. Longnon conjectures that the territory was located between Lepanto and Larissa. It must not be overlooked that William may never even have taken possession of the territory that was to be granted to him by Baldwin. In this connection the convention states specifically that, at the time of the treaty, the territory was in the hands of Michael II's family: "Terra . . . que a memorato despoto ejusque filio vel aliis detinetur ad presens." (*Ibid.*, 142, note 1.)

to Baldwin, it would seem that his best course of action would be to remain aloof, or at least benevolently neutral with respect to coalition affairs. In the meantime Baldwin could take advantage of the critical situation of Michael Palaeologos (Michael's external problems were complicated by internal disturbances)⁶⁷ to seek concessions from him. Thus, according to Acropolites, Baldwin dispatched ambassadors to Michael demanding the return of certain territories.⁶⁸ The envoys asked successively for the areas extending from Salonika,⁶⁹ Serres,⁷⁰ and Voleros⁷¹ eastward to Constantinople, each time reducing their demands. Palaeologos, however, boldly refused every demand, and even countered with one of his own for half the customs' duties of Constantinople plus half the revenue from the gold mint.⁷² This embassy of Baldwin has been termed strange, even absurd,⁷³ but in the context in which we have here placed it, it appears to be merely a logical attempt on the part of Baldwin to take advantage of the situation of Palaeologos and perhaps thereby to secure a buffer area between Constantinople and the territory of the coalition.⁷⁴

This interpretation would seem satisfactorily to explain the mention of Baldwin's name in connection with William's marriage and his gift of territory to the Prince. It accounts, moreover, for the attitude and actions of Baldwin⁷⁵ at a time for which we have little information about him or his

⁶⁷ The supporters of young John Lascaris, whose imperial rights Palaeologos had usurped, were a constant menace to him.

⁶⁸ Acrop., 161 ff.

⁶⁹ Palaeologos refused to cede Salonika, saying it was like a fatherland to him since his father, who had been its governor, was buried there.

⁷⁰ Serres lies east and a little north of Salonika on the Struma River.

⁷¹ K. Amantos in "Βολερών," *Ἑλληνικά*, II (1929) 124–126, after analyzing the numerous theories regarding its location, believes that it should be situated in today's western Thrace, near Nestos but somewhat to the east, that is, roughly halfway between Salonika and Gallipoli.

⁷² Acrop., 163: . . . τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κομμερκίου αὐτῶν τὴν ἡμίσειαν καὶ τοῦ χρυσεψηγείου αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάλογον ὡσαύτως εἰσοδόν.

⁷³ Acrop., 162, himself, terms the demands absurd and exaggerated: *ὑπέρογκά τινα ζητοῦντες καὶ ἀτόπων ὄντα ἐγγύς*. It is possible that Acropolites has exaggerated his account of the embassy in order to display his hero, Palaeologos, in a good light. Of modern scholars, Gardner, *Lascaris*, 246, writes: "The story has a bombastic ring to it." Diehl, *L'Europe orientale* (Paris, 1945) 183, makes the rather surprising observation that Baldwin made his demands "dans sa naïveté." See also W. Miller, *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV (New York, 1927) 509: "Baldwin II, with naïve ignorance . . ."

⁷⁴ C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue, restaurateur de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1926) 39, dates this embassy of Baldwin *after* the battle of Pelagonia. I see no reason, however, to change the order of Acropolites, who introduces it just before that battle and along with Palaeologos' embassies to Manfred, Michael II, and Villehardouin. (See *infra* notes 90–93.) My explanation of Baldwin's purpose in dispatching the embassy seems to justify leaving it chronologically exactly where it is to be found in Acropolites.

⁷⁵ Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di Re Manfredi," 24–25, believes that Baldwin, in order to guarantee Constantinople's security in the event of Nicaea's destruction by the coalition,

empire;⁷⁶ and finally it explains, and sets in its proper context, a remarkable passage in Acropolites.

Besides the differences already noted with respect to the three allies, there were others of importance. All three rulers were, so to speak, of different religious faiths,⁷⁷ of different races, and products of different *milieux*: Michael II was an astute, calculating Byzantine; William, the brave and crafty epitome of French chivalry transplanted to Greek soil;⁷⁸ and Manfred, a product of the Sicilian kingdom's *mélange* of diverse cultures.⁷⁹ Gregoras noted these differences well when he wrote that "it would not be difficult to plant discord among the three allies since William and Manfred were different in race from Michael Angelos."⁸⁰

Considering the differences in race and character, and particularly the conflict in aims over Constantinople and Salonika, it is remarkable that the three rulers could have overcome their mutual suspicions and achieved even a temporary *modus vivendi*. Perhaps the only explanation for this is a more or less satisfactory division of prospective conquests. The Greek historian Gregoras in fact records exactly this, that the allies, certain of victory, but

made a secret alliance with Manfred directed against the Despot and William. His evidence is a supposed visit of Baldwin to Manfred in August of 1258, which is mentioned by the Italian chronicler M. Spinelli (or Spinello), *Annali di Matteo Spinello da Giovenazzo*, ed. G. Vigo and G. Dura (Naples, 1872) 42: "A li nove d' Agosto lo Mparatore de Costantenobole ionse à Baro, che veneva da Venetia, et lo Rè lo mandaie à trovare." (Cf. edition of G. Del Re, *Cronisti e Scrittori Sincroni Napoletani*, II [Naples, 1845], with slightly different spelling. On the controversy over the authenticity of Spinelli's work see *infra*, note 165.) Now there seems to be no mention of a visit of Baldwin to Manfred at this time in any other Greek or Latin source. Furthermore, although Del Giudice cites three papal letters to support his opinion, they are all *post eventu* and seem applicable rather to the alliance of Manfred and Baldwin entered into after Baldwin's expulsion from Constantinople, two years, that is, *after* Pelagonia. It is very possible, therefore, that Spinelli's chronology is confused at this point and that he is referring instead to a later visit of Baldwin. M. Sanudo, *Fragmentum*, 172, in fact records such a visit of Baldwin to Manfred two years later (1261), just after Baldwin's flight from captured Constantinople: "... venit in Apuliam illic inveniens, quod princeps Manfredus Tarenti in Apulia et Sicilia regnabat. Qui princeps eum honorifice suscepit . . ."

⁷⁶ The Greek historians, Acropolites, for example, have little to say on the Latin Empire, and the most important Latin accounts end in 1242.

⁷⁷ Villehardouin was a member of the Roman church, the Despot belonged to the Greek Patriarchate of Ochrida (not Nicaea), and Manfred was excommunicated from the Roman church.

⁷⁸ William was born in the Morea and spoke Greek. See *Greek Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, line 4130. Frederick II spoke fluent Greek, which he had learned in Sicily, and the same may be true of his son Manfred. In any case, Professor E. Kantorowicz, author of *Frederick the Second* (London, 1931), informs me that such is his opinion.

⁷⁹ Though probably less so than in Norman times, the Sicilian court was still subject to Norman, Arabic, and Greek influences.

⁸⁰ 74, lines 4-7.

presumably unable to agree on a division of future spoils, drew lots for their share of the loot even before undertaking their campaign.⁸¹ It is to be regretted, if Gregoras is to be believed, that no authentic record of the provisions of this partition has remained. We unfortunately possess only the few hints already mentioned.

No doubt the crucial point in the life of the alliance would be reached after the smashing of the Nicene forces and before assaults on Salonika and Constantinople. At that time either the alliance would fall to pieces or perhaps William, with his superior forces, would seize the lion's share of the spoils. It is my hypothesis that, to obviate the latter eventuality, a secret agreement was concluded between Michael II and Manfred. To begin with, the Despot and Manfred would cooperate with William to achieve their common aim, the destruction of the Nicene state. Then the united Epirot and Sicilian forces, supported by the defeated Greeks, presumably not averse to aiding Michael II against the Latin conquerors, would assault Salonika, after which, together, they would perhaps attack William and drive him and the Latin barons out of Greece. Preferred by many Greeks of western Greece to the Asiatic Nicaenes⁸² and with (as he thought) a better claim to Constantinople than Palaeologos,⁸³ the Despot could pose as the champion of orthodoxy and of the old Byzantine Empire against the usurping Franks. Then Manfred, with his fleet and German troops, would aid the Despot to take Constantinople from their common enemies, the Papacy and Venice. As his reward Manfred would perhaps secure a great kingdom on the Adriatic sea.⁸⁴ Possession of such a realm, together with the aid of Greek troops to help in his Italian wars, would enable Manfred to exert strong

⁸¹ Gregoras, 72: καὶ ὡς ἤδη βεβαίως ἔχοντες κλήρω ταύτην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλάγχανον, πρὶν ᾗψασθαι ἔργον. The phrase "to draw lots" is probably figurative, since there is no evidence that Manfred was in Greece at this time. On the other hand, it should be noted that, according to Gregoras, Manfred participated in person at the battle of Pelagonia. Compare with this passage the account of Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835) 787, lines 10–18, which describes how the Latin conquerors, after Constantinople's conquest in 1204, cast lots for territories, some not yet in their possession.

⁸² See *supra*, note 7.

⁸³ Actually, Michael II had at least as distinguished a lineage as Michael Palaeologos, since, like the latter, he was descended from the Comnenoi, Ducas, and Angeloi, the last-named family ruling in Constantinople at the time of the Latin conquest in 1204. Thus the Despot called himself "Michael Angelos Ducas Comnenos," while Palaeologos styled himself "Michael Ducas Angelos Comnenos Palaeologos." (On these genealogies see Gardner, *Lascarids*, table, p. 308.) Michael II could claim imperial prerogatives also from his uncle Theodore I of Epirus, who had assumed the imperial title in Salonika after his conquest of that city in 1224 (see *supra*, note 27, and Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, appendix V, 653). Though Michael II, like his father Michael I, was illegitimate, this fact does not appear to have been used against him except perhaps by the Nicene historians, who sometimes refer to him as νόθος.

⁸⁴ Norden, *op. cit.*, 333–334: "ein grosses Gebiet am Adriatischen Meere."

pressure on the states of Italy, in particular on his chief opponent, the Papacy. As for any suspicions on the part of William during the Nicene campaign, they could perhaps be allayed by the promise of Salonika.⁸⁵

Acceptance of this hypothesis, I believe, will help to explain several puzzling considerations, such as the continued aid of Manfred to his father-in-law, Michael II, even after the debacle of Pelagonia for which the latter was in large part responsible; the fact that at Pelagonia discord arose between the men of John the Bastard and William, rather than between those of the Bastard and Manfred (a point to be discussed below); the fact that the Bastard, despite precipitating the rupture of his father's alliance,⁸⁶ returned shortly afterwards to aid his father, who apparently showed no animosity toward him; the fact that Manfred's dowry was so much more important than that of William (indicating a partiality toward Manfred from the start); the fact that both Manfred and Michael II, unlike William, were not faithful sons and allies of the Roman church;⁸⁷ and, finally, the suggestive fact that Pachymeres, in mentioning that Michael II proposed to use Manfred's German soldiers to conquer the papal forces of Constantinople, made no reference to William and his troops.⁸⁸

A question immediately arises regarding this hypothesis: could Michael II trust Manfred? As already noted, Manfred did not have the disreputable character that has too often been attributed to him. Moreover, he was, it seems, genuinely fond of his wife, the Despot's daughter, who, having a close relationship also with her father, conceivably could be depended upon to maintain peace between the two.⁸⁹ Finally, if we note the considerable aid sent by Manfred to Michael II before and particularly *after* the loss of the latter's entire Despotate (at a time when the Despot would normally

⁸⁵ The line *ἐνίκων καὶ συμμάχους αὐτοῖς* [Epirots] *στρατηγὸν ἐπαγομένους τὸν Ἀχαΐας πρίγκιπα*, found in Palaeologos' so-called Autobiography, VII, 4 (J. Troitzki, *Imp. Michaelis Palaeologi, De Vita Sua* . . . [Petersburg, 1885]) — actually it is a charter for a monastery — could perhaps be construed as meaning that William was named commander-in-chief of the coalition forces. However, since other sources mention nothing of a commander-in-chief, it is probable that Michael here exaggerated his statement in order to exalt his own victory by claiming to have captured the commanding general. It was, in fact, precisely the lack of such a commander that contributed to the disunity which brought about the allied collapse.

⁸⁶ See *infra*, notes 146 and 158.

⁸⁷ An overlooked passage in M. Spinelli, ed. Vigo-Dura, 43 (ed. Del Re, *op. cit.*, 641), states that in December of 1259, (presumably) Nikephoros, son of the Despot, went to see the Pope, apparently to secure aid for his father through a reconciliation of the Papacy and Manfred. If this passage is accepted as authentic, it would emphasize still more the close rapport existing between Manfred and the Despot. (See note 165 for the passage and analysis.)

⁸⁸ Pach., 83, line 19.

⁸⁹ Dendias, *Helen*, 228–231.

have been of little use to him), we are constrained to admit that Michael's confidence in Manfred was warranted.

The foregoing analysis, lengthy as it may be, is vital for its indication that the ambitions of the three members of the coalition were from the very outset sharply conflicting, indeed irreconcilable. This fact is admirably revealed by the sources themselves, whose very discrepancies regarding the ambitions of the protagonists serve only to emphasize even more sharply the frailty of the alliance. The conclusions that have been reached, though in great part hypothetical, seem reasonable, given the condition of the sources. It now remains to consider whether this coalition, beset by such fundamental differences in race, ambition, and character, could survive.

II. THE BATTLE AND VICTORY OF MICHAEL PALAEOLOGOS AT PELAGONIA

Michael Palaeologos, having only recently attained the imperial rank by a *coup d'état*, was understandably not eager to risk his throne in a battle-field encounter with this powerful Greco-Latin coalition. Accordingly, soon after his coronation (December 25, 1258), he made a calculated attempt to dissolve the alliance by the dispatch of an embassy to each party, offering concessions and presumably playing upon their conflicting aims. To Manfred he sent Nikephoros Alyattes,⁹⁰ who probably proposed a renewal of the old Nicene-Sicilian alliance together perhaps with the release of Manfred's sister Constance, widow of Vatatzes, at that time held practically a prisoner in Nicaea. But Manfred, as we are told, "persuaded by the fantasy of greater gain," rejected the overtures and cast the envoy into prison, where he was to remain for two years.⁹¹

Equally futile was the embassy to Achaia, for the ambitious William also anticipated benefits from the alliance.⁹² As for Michael II, we learn that he replied insultingly and "talked of immoderate things" to the blind envoy, Theodore Philes, when the latter offered territorial concessions.⁹³

Palaeologos' most skillful move, however, was the dispatch of an embassy

⁹⁰ Acrop., 165, lines 4–6. For disputed date of Michael VIII's coronation and embassies, see F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches* (Munich, 1932) nos. 1857 and 1861–1864, and G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (Munich, 1952) 357, note 1.

⁹¹ Alyattes, whom Hopf, *Geschichte*, 282, erroneously calls Manuel, had had his tongue removed by Theodore II as punishment for some unknown transgression. Imprisoned by Manfred, he was released, it seems reasonable to believe, sometime after Constantinople's recapture in July of 1261, when Palaeologos returned Constance to Manfred in exchange for the captured Alexis Strategopulos. This would be about two years after Alyattes' original imprisonment, and would correspond, therefore, to Acropolites' statement that he remained in prison for two years. See Acrop., 165, lines 6–7.

⁹² Acrop., 165, line 10. See also Dendias, *Helen*, 225.

⁹³ Acrop., 163, line 18. The "insulting and immoderate things" were, no doubt, threats

to the Papacy, perhaps the only power capable of preventing the destruction of his empire. Not only did the Holy See wield vast moral and political power as protector of the Latin states of Greece; it was the implacable enemy of the Staufen as well, and as such would not hesitate to restrain Manfred from extending his power, particularly over Salonika and Constantinople. Though Michael was aware of this, it is likely that he had yet another consideration in mind to enable him to secure important concessions from the Papacy. By offering to the Curia union of the churches, thus renewing the nearly consummated negotiations between Vatatzes and Pope Innocent IV (in 1254 Innocent had implicitly promised Vatatzes Constantinople in exchange for union, but the death of both had ended negotiations),⁹⁴ Palaeologos would demand recognition of his usurpation of the Nicene throne. If secured it would be an achievement indeed, since, besides menacing with papal censure any Latin attacker of his empire, it could help to inaugurate a final stage in the dissolution of the Latin Empire, now tottering slowly to its ruin.

The Registers of Alexander IV contain no papal reply to Michael's embassy. It is permissible therefore to infer, unless documents have been lost, that the Curia, always a skillful bargainer, considered the price of union too high. It was well aware that recognition of Michael's claims to the Nicene throne, that is, to hegemony of the Roman Empire as styled by the Asiatic Greeks, would mean virtual abandonment of the claims of Baldwin and probable restoration of Constantinople to the Greeks. Furthermore, with the rapid change in Nicene political conditions, it was perhaps too soon to gauge accurately the motives of the usurper and the strength of his ascendancy in Nicaea. Finally, it must have been obvious that Michael's offer of union was based exclusively on his fear of Nicaea's destruction at the hands of the coalition. Union based on such flimsy foundations, as 1204 and subsequent events had amply demonstrated, would be without sincerity and doomed from the start to failure. On this basis, it would be better, perhaps, not to follow up the proposal and to adopt a policy of watchful waiting.⁹⁵

to punish Palaeologos for his usurpation of the imperial throne and to capture Constantinople. Acropolites, it may be noted, is the only historian (besides Scutariotes, who followed his account) to mention Palaeologos' embassies to the allies. As for Philes, he too had for some unknown reason been blinded by Theodore II. It is difficult to judge Palaeologos' motives in sending maimed envoys to the allies. Perhaps they had not been completely disabled by their punishments. In any case, understanding as we do the realistic temper of Palaeologos' character, it is clear that his use of them was deliberate.

* For the papal correspondence see F. Schillman, "Zur Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV," *Römische Quartalschrift*, XXII (1908) Heft 4, 108 ff. See Wolff, *Latin Empire*, 643 ff. for a good summary of the negotiations.

⁹⁵ The basis for belief that such an embassy took place is a letter sent by Palaeologos to

Despite the abortiveness of this attempt to secure papal intervention, Michael's embassy was of signal importance. It marked the first appearance of the pattern of diplomacy that he was to follow during his entire reign: offers to exchange church union for papal interference in the designs of Latin princes coveting Greek territory.

Although unsuccessful in his diplomatic proposals, Palaeologos was not disheartened. Instead, he seized the offensive militarily to crush Michael of Epirus before aid could be mobilized by his allies.⁹⁶ At once dispatching an army to the west under the command of his brother John the Sebastocrator, and including as subordinate commanders Alexis Strategopoulos, the Grand Domestic, and Constantine Tornikes, the Grand Primikerios, Palaeologos ordered them to march rapidly until they should encounter the army of the Despot.⁹⁷ The Emperor himself remained in Nicaea.

Departing in the latter part of September 1259,⁹⁸ and gathering on the way the territorial forces garrisoned in Thrace and Macedonia, the army

Clement IV. It is dated January or February, 1267, and contains a passage reading: "When I took in my hands the helm of the empire, I immediately sent an embassy to Pope Alexander of blessed memory in order to discuss the union with him" (ὡς . . . τῆς βασιλείου ὁλκάδος τὰς οἰάκας ἐνεχειρίσθημεν, εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸν τῆς μακαρίας μνήμης Πάπαν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀποστείλαντες τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης αὐτῷ διελέχθημεν). Printed in N. Festa, "Lettera inedita dell' Imperatore Michele Paleologo al Pontefice Clemente IV," *Bessarione*, VI (1899–1900) 48 ff., and cf. "Ancora la lettera di Michele Paleologo a Clemente IV," *loc. cit.*, 529 ff. Both the letter and embassy have been the subjects of controversy. Festa, forgetting Palaeologos' first coronation at Nicaea, mistakenly believes Michael's statement to refer to events posterior to the capture of Constantinople in 1261, that is, to two years *after* Pelagonia. Norden, *op. cit.*, 382, and apparently Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1864, accept the letter as genuine and applicable to events occurring *before* the battle of Pelagonia. They do not, however, fully analyze its significance. Most other authorities overlook the letter completely, as for example Gardner, *Lascarids*, and Chapman, *op. cit.* Despite the fact that the Byzantine sources mention no such embassy at this time, I believe that the passage in question indicates that an embassy was actually sent to the Papacy because (1) Michael was far too able a diplomat to neglect an appeal to the Pope at this critical time; (2) a unionist proposal was nothing new; and (3), contrary to the belief of some historians, we know that this letter is not unique, and that Michael and the Pope had other correspondence before Constantinople's recapture in July of 1261. For example, a papal letter of April 28, 1261, requests Michael to set free two merchants of Lucca who had been seized at Adramyttion in Asia Minor. They were subsequently released, as we are informed by the *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, I (Turin, 1854) cols. 1345 and 1397. On Michael's policy toward Rome culminating in the union of Lyons see D. J. Geanakoplos, "Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Union of Lyons (1274)," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLVI (1953) 79 ff.

⁹⁶ Chapman, *op. cit.*, 35, believes (probably correctly) that Palaeologos, by dispatching legates to the allies, sought to gain time to reorganize his army. If the *Chronicle of the Morea* is correct that he sent messengers to request the aid of Germans, Hungarians, and Serbs, time, of course, would have been an important factor. See ed. Kalonaros, lines 3591–99, and ed. Longnon, pars. 268 and 270.

⁹⁷ Acrop., 165, lines 17–19.

⁹⁸ Gregoras, 72, offers a fairly definite clue for dating this battle. He writes that the Nicene troops left Nicaea μικρὸν μετὰ τροπῆς θερινᾶς. See also *ibid.*, 73, lines 1–3. In view of these two passages, it seems that the battle took place sometime after September 21, either at

marched swiftly along the Via Egnatia and soon reached Ochrida and Deavolis.⁹⁹ Then moving north by the pass of Vodena, it completely surprised Michael II and his army, encamped at Kastoria in Macedonia. The Epirot forces, caught off guard, retreated so hastily that many men were killed at night in the precipitous passes.¹⁰⁰ Their leader, the Despot, withdrew behind the Pyrenaea mountains separating Old and New Epirus¹⁰¹ and encamped near Avlona, then in the possession of Manfred. From there he dispatched envoys to summon aid from his two allies.¹⁰²

Meanwhile the forces of John Palaeologos captured Ochrida and Deavolis. In quick succession they took many other cities in Macedonia and Epirus. The Despot had now lost the larger part of his territories.¹⁰³

But aid for Michael II soon came, and with it his allies probably sought to implement the plans of conquest meditated since the formation of the coalition.¹⁰⁴ Manfred's aid consisted of a picked force of four hundred

the end of September or more probably in October or November, 1259. Cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1882 ("Spätherbst"), and Dendias, "Le Roi Manfred . . ." 55 ("pendant l'automne").

⁹⁹ The Via Egnatia (the old Roman road extending from Avlona-Dyrrachium through Salonika to Constantinople) is not explicitly mentioned in the sources, but it was undoubtedly used by both armies, since almost all the toponymics mentioned are situated on or near it.

¹⁰⁰ Acrop., 165–166. Among these was the Despot's brother-in-law, Petraliphas. One would expect the Despot to have fled rapidly along the Via Egnatia, of which a spur ran from Kastoria north to Pelagonia. However, the suddenness of the attack, plus the fact that the enemy itself was probably using the Via Egnatia, doubtless forced him to escape to the west over the mountains. Cf. K. Miller, *Itineraria Romana* (Stuttgart, 1916) 521.

¹⁰¹ Acrop., 166, line 16. Old Epirus extended from the Ambracian Gulf north to the Akrokeranian mountains; New Epirus, from the latter north to Dyrrachium. It is almost impossible from the apparently conflicting sources to tell if the Pyrenaea mountains extend from east to west or from north to south. See Meliarakes, 526, note 1, who believes that they were part of the Pindus mountains and therefore extended from north to south. His opinion seems the most reasonable. On topographical problems of this battle see J. von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien* (Jena, 1854), particularly map, 347.

¹⁰² According to Gregoras, 73 (ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ τῶν Βελλεγράδων, ὑψηλὸν τε καὶ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὑπερνέφελον φρούριον), the Despot fled to Epirus, where he besieged the lofty citadel of Bellegrada (modern Berat) with the intention of rushing down from its heights to attack the Nicenes. In actual fact, Bellegrada was at that time in the possession of Manfred, the ally of Michael II, and any attack upon it was therefore unlikely. See also Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 526.

¹⁰³ Acrop., 167. See also Autobiography, VII, 6, where Palaeologos writes that he captured Akarnania and Aetolia from the Despot. Note the interesting passage in Acrop., 167, lines 14 ff., describing the differences in the character of western and eastern Greeks.

¹⁰⁴ Gregoras, 72, lines 2–6, writes: "They came not so much to aid the Despot as to enlarge their own territories and to occupy alien cities. For they hoped that all the Roman [Nicene] territory from the Ionian [Adriatic] directly to Byzantium would fall to them without effort." Similarly the Autobiography of Palaeologos, VII, 4: "They came to aid not because of the alliance, but to enrich themselves and to become masters, so they believed, of our country."

It might be mentioned that there are some discrepancies in the Greek sources at this point. According to Acropolites, the Despot was in desperate straits when he invoked aid from his allies. Gregoras mentions no such bad fortune and attributes the Despot's summons

superbly mounted and completely armed German cavalry,¹⁰⁵ perhaps transported to Greece by ships of Michael II.¹⁰⁶ According to Gregoras and Matteo Spinelli, a contemporary Italian chronicler, Manfred came personally to lead his troops.¹⁰⁷ This, however, has been effectively disproved.¹⁰⁸

for aid to the opportunity to conquer Nicaea, which at that time was internally disturbed over Palaeologos' usurpation. Gregoras further differs from Pachymeres and Acropolites in stating that Palaeologos at this time held only the rank of Despot and had not yet been crowned Emperor. (See Gregoras, 72, line 10.) It should be remembered, of course, that Gregoras wrote a century after the events and is therefore usually less-informed than Acropolites or Pachymeres.

¹⁰⁵ Acrop., 168, calls them "cataphracts": τετρακοσίους ἱππώτας, ὅπλοις ἐχυροῖς κατάφρακτοι, καὶ ὑψαύχεσιν ἵπποις καὶ ἀγερῶχοις ἐποχοῦμενοι. See Scutariotes, 545. The term "cataphracts" refers to completely and heavily armed cavalry. Cf. Pach., 83, who writes that they numbered 3,000 German cavalry. Pachymeres is either misinformed or exaggerating to magnify the Nicene victory: παρὰ μὲν τοῦ Μανφρὲ τρισχιλίους οὓς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι Καβαλλάριους λαμβάνει, ἀνδρείους. . . Marino Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107, says that Manfred sent 400 German men-at-arms: "avuti dal Rè Manfredi 400 huomini d'armi Tedeschi." Michael Palaeologos' Autobiography, 6, mentions German and Sicilian troops as if they were separate units: ἀλαμανοὺς, σικελοὺς.

¹⁰⁶ See Pach., 83, lines 3 ff.

¹⁰⁷ Gregoras, 71: ὁ Ἀχαΐας πρίγκιψ . . . καὶ ὁ τῆς Σικελίας τότε κρατῶν Μανφρὲ . . . πλῆθος ἐπαγόμενοι στρατιᾶς and 75: ὁ δὲ τῆς Σικελίας ῥῆξ διέδρα λαθὼν σὺν ὀλίγοις πάντῃ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. Spinelli, *Diurnali* (ed. Del Re, *Cronisti e scrittori* . . . , II [Naples, 1868]) 641: "Lo Settembre detto anno, Re Manfredò andao in Romagna." This passage is listed under the year 1260 in the Vigo-Dura edition, which Dendias — see next note — apparently did not use.

¹⁰⁸ By M. Dendias in his article "Le Roi Manfred de Sicile et la bataille de Pelagonie," *Mélanges Charles Diehl*, I (Paris, 1930), 55 ff. This work and E. Darkó's *Byzantinisch-ungarische Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Weimar, 1933) 10 ff., are the only articles dealing with the battle proper. While Darkó is mainly concerned with the presence of Hungarian troops, Dendias deals exclusively with the absence of Manfred and does not touch upon the many problems concerning the battle and its background. Dendias conclusively proves Manfred's absence, despite the statements of Gregoras and Spinelli, by demonstrating: (1) that the contemporary Acropolites, who is anti-Latin and presumably should have been delighted at Manfred's defeat, makes no mention of Manfred's presence; (2) that no other Italian chronicler confirms his appearance; (3) that the word "andao" (used here by Spinelli to apply to Manfred's crossing) was normally employed by him to signify a land march — for a crossing by sea he usually wrote "passó"; (4) that the word "Romagna" refers to the Romagna of Italy and not to Romania, meaning Greece (on the use of the word "Romania" see the article of R. L. Wolff, "Romania: The Latin Empire of Constantinople," *Speculum*, XXIII [1948] 1 ff.); (5) that at the time of the battle, Manfred was actually engaged in an expedition to the Italian Romagna against the Guelphs, and, in fact, never did set foot in Greece. Dendias expresses the belief that the presence of Manfred at Pelagonia was a rumor spread by the monarch's Guelph opponents and picked up some fifty years later by Gregoras. Dendias' thesis had apparently already been suggested by Meliarakes, a Greek historian of the late nineteenth century. See *Nicaea*, 533, note 3. C. Du Cange, too, as early as the seventeenth century (*Histoire de l'empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français*, ed. Buchon, I [Paris, 1826] 333), questioned Manfred's presence at the battle, writing, "ce qui n'est pas toute-fois probable." It should be noted that historians have neglected to make use of the Autobiography of Palaeologos as additional evidence for Manfred's absence. In the long recital of his victories over the Latins, Palaeologos would almost surely have mentioned Manfred's defeat had Manfred actually been present. Palaeologos does in fact note the presence of William of Achaia and the German and Sicilian troops, claiming that he took all prisoners without exception, VII, 4–6. In his work *Nicaea*,

Unlike Manfred, who was occupied with a campaign against the Guelphs in the Italian Romagna, William Villehardouin came in person to aid the Despot with an army which included a great number of Franks and Greeks of Achaia.¹⁰⁹ A general feudal levy seems to have been imposed on all his vassals,¹¹⁰ for in the French and Greek versions of the *Chronicle* and the Autobiography of Michael Palaeologos, we read that William's forces included troops from Negropont, the Archipelago, and Athens, and that many feudal lords personally accompanied him, including those of Salona, Boudonitza, Naxos, and Athens.¹¹¹

Accompanying Michael II and his Epirot troops¹¹² were his two sons, Nikephoros the elder, and the bastard son, John. The latter, as Pachymeres and Sanudo inform us, commanded numerous forces of Vlachs from Great Vlachia (Thessaly), the daughter of whose chieftain, Taron, he had married.¹¹³

The places of assembly for the heterogeneous forces of this grand alliance are not clearly designated by the sources. Possibly Manfred's troops debarked at his port of Avlona to join the Despot and his troops already encamped there. As for the forces of Villehardouin, they crossed the Gulf of Corinth to Naupactus to meet the Epirot forces there or at Arta.¹¹⁴ Thence they marched to Thalassinon in Vlachia, where they assembled with troops from the other Latin principalities of Greece.¹¹⁵

535, Meliarakes remarks that the Autobiography, IX, 7, refers to Manfred as ὁ βάρβαρος ῥῆξ. This is incorrect. It seems instead to indicate Manfred's successor, Charles of Anjou.

¹⁰⁹ Acrop., 168: ὁ Ἀχαΐας πρίγκιψ τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν συλλεξάμενος . . . ἦγε δὲ οὗτος ἀπειροπληθὲς τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ Φραγγικοῦ γένους ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐκ τῶν οἰκητόρων Ῥωμαίων Ἀχαΐας καὶ Πελοποννήσου, ὧν οὗτος ἦρχεν· οἱ πλείους δὲ τοῦ τῶν Λακωνίων ὑπάρχον γένους. Another reading for Λακωνίων is Λατίνων. See *ibid.*, note 16 (ed. Heisenberg). Pach., 83, writes that William came ὅλον (probably meaning "himself" or "in person") with his troops: τὸν δὲ γε πρίγκιπα ὅλον εἶχε σὺν ταῖς στρατεύμασιν. Cf. Gregoras, 71, line 20.

¹¹⁰ Greek *Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, line 3625: καταπαντοῦθε ἐσώρεψεν ὅλα του τὰ φουσσᾶτα; French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon: "si amassa toute sa gente de la Morée, et jusques a Malvesie, de pié et de cheval, le plus efforcement que il pot."

¹¹¹ French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon, par. 262, and Greek *Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, lines 3632 ff. Cf. Autobiography, VII, 4.

¹¹² Acrop., 168: τοὺς μὲν οἰκείους ἀπαξιαπλῶς συλλέγδην πάντας συνήθροισε; Gregoras, 71: ὅθεν πολλὰν ἐκ τῆς χώρας αὐτοῦ συνήθροισε στρατιάν.

¹¹³ Pach., 83, lines 6–9. Pachymeres is the only Byzantine source specifically to mention the troop contingent of the Bastard. Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107, corroborates Pachymeres: "era Signor de la Parte [Neopatras] d'Odrich [Lidorichi] e finalmente della Blachia [Grand Vlachia]." Acrop., 170, lines 6 ff., mentions nothing about the Bastard's troops, stating only that he deserted to Palaeologos when the coalition forces were defeated. On Taron see *supra*, note 61.

¹¹⁴ French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon, pars. 257 ff., and Greek *Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, line 3628: ἐκεῖ στῆν Ἀρτα ἐνώθησαν.

¹¹⁵ Greek *Chronicle*, lines 3635–3636: καὶ ἡῤασιν τὸν Πρίγκιπα ἀπέσω εἰς τὴν Βλαχίαν στὸν κάμπον τοῦ Θαλασσινοῦ ἐνώθησαν ἀλλήλως. According to these lines, Thalassinon would be

Meanwhile the Nicene army was advancing to meet the allied forces. With respect to the composition and size of the imperial army, accuracy is difficult to achieve, since the Greek sources are not specific, and the statements of the *Chronicle of the Morea* are often exaggerated, particularly as they obviously seek to apologize for the ensuing Frankish defeat by over-emphasizing the strength of the enemy. According to the Greek and French versions of the *Chronicle*, the Nicene army included mercenaries from the West, consisting of Hungarian, Serb, Bulgar, and German horsemen,¹¹⁶ as

situated within the confines of Vlachia. Schmitt, *The Chronicle of the Morea* (London, 1904) 635, believes that it may possibly correspond to Elassona, located northwest of Larissa. The other sources disagree on the place of assembly for all the allies. The French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon, pars. 274 ff., states Neo-Patras; and Gregoras, 73, says that the allied forces assembled on the plains of Avlona. As for Acropolites or Pachymeres, neither mentions the allied assembly point. Perhaps Thalassinon is most correct since it was, with respect to Latin Greece, centrally located. It seems at first glance strange, however, that the allies should have marched from Epirus eastward to Thessaly and then back again to Macedonia. The probable reason for such a route, however (if correct), is that they would wish to avoid crossing the Pindus mountains, which would have been necessary had they penetrated directly to Macedonia from Epirus. The troops of the Bastard had apparently already collided with the Nicones after the latter's capture of Verroia. In fact, according to Pachymeres, 83, line 12, the Bastard had even prevented the advance of the Nicones for a time.

¹¹⁶ The exact figures are 300 German, 1500 Hungarian, 600 Serb, and a detachment of Bulgar cavalry. (See Greek *Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, lines 3591 ff., 3706 ff., and 3608 with note. Also French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon, pars. 270 and 279.) These statements are unsupported by solid evidence; yet when one considers how formidable the coalition must have appeared, it seems likely that Palaeologos would not have hesitated to secure foreign mercenaries if possible. Historians are of varying opinions on this aid. Hopf, *Geschichte*, 282, note 95, cites the example of a German adventurer, Bernhard III of Sponheim-Ortenburg, who, a few years before, had taken part in similar battles in Greece. Kalonaros (note to line 4021) believes that the Duke de Karentany, a German mentioned in the *Chronicle of the Morea* as fighting valiantly on the Nicene side (his name, usually identified with "Karinthia," should not be confused with that of the Frankish Lord of Karitaina) is a fictitious character. It is interesting, however, that he is mentioned in the *Chronicle* (ed. Kalonaros, line 7103) as present later at Tagliacozzo on the side of Conradin. E. Darkó, *Byzantinisch-ungarische Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, 10 ff., believes that the bulk of the Nicene army consisted of Hungarian and, to a lesser degree, of Cuman, Bulgar, and Turkish archers. He therefore speaks of the battle as ending "mit vollem Siege der nicaenische-ungarischen Truppen." Elsewhere, he stresses "eine glückliche Kooperation beider Mächte" (i.e., Nicene and Hungarian). His proof consists of two documents mentioning Greek troops fighting for the Hungarians in 1260. Darkó argues, on the basis of these documents, that the presence of Greek troops in Hungary on that date could have been only in exchange for the dispatch of Hungarian troops to Palaeologos the year before to participate at Pelagonia (see *op. cit.*, 17–19). G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (Munich, 1952) 357, note 2, objects to this thesis of Darkó on the grounds that even had Hungarians been present at Pelagonia, they could not have been very numerous since none of the Byzantine sources mentions them.

Regarding the presence of Serbian auxiliaries at the battle, it seems unlikely, despite the *Chronicle of the Morea*, that they were secured from the Serbian Kral, since he was an enemy of Palaeologos, who had usurped the imperial rights of John Lascaris, brother of the Kral's wife. The possibility should not be overlooked, of course, that independent Serbs could have been serving as mercenaries in the Nicene army. That only Greeks, Turks, and

well as Turkish and Cuman cavalry and Greek archers.¹¹⁷ These forces were, of course, in addition to the regular troops and territorial forces of Macedonia and Thrace. It is to be noted that no source mentions Latin troops fighting on the Nicene side; nevertheless, it is likely that there were at least a few. They had been prominent in the armies of Palaeologos' predecessors at Nicaea, and there is no reason to believe that he had discharged them. On the contrary, Michael owed his accession to the throne largely to the devotion of the Latin troops which he had commanded as Grand Constable.¹¹⁸

Despite the lack of precise information,¹¹⁹ one gets a clear impression from the sources (except as mentioned from the *Chronicle of the Morea*) that the allied forces surpassed those of Nicaea in size.¹²⁰ Hence, it is clear that if the numerically inferior Nicenes were to achieve victory, they would

Cumans constituted the Nicene forces seems indicated in a hitherto neglected encomium of Manuel Holobolos which was delivered before the Emperor Palaeologos only two years after the battle. It reads: Αὔσονες ὁ στρατός, Σκύθαι καὶ Μοῖρά τις Περσική. See *Manuelis Holoboli, Orationes*, ed. M. Treu (Potsdam, 1906) 40. (I am greatly indebted to Professor F. Dölger of the University of Munich, Germany, for kindly drawing my attention to this work and for loaning me his own copy.) Regarding this source, it should be noted that in view of the common tendency of Byzantine encomia to exaggerate, it is possible that in this case Holobolos sought to attribute the victory exclusively to Palaeologos and his regular troops. On the other hand, since the use of terms in encomia was often vague, it is also possible that "Scythian and Persian" might refer to Bulgars and Hungarians.

¹¹⁷ The presence of Cumans is verified by all the Greek sources. (For a good account of the Cumans see D. Rasovskii, "Polovtsy," *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, VII [1935] 245-262, and later issues.) Like the Nicenes, the Latins too had an alliance with the Cumans, which dated from 1237. Together, the Latins and the Cumans had attacked a number of Nicene possessions, including Tsurulum, the key to the approaches of Constantinople. See Wolff, *Latin Empire*, 593 and 595. As for the Turks, Michael Palaeologos had learned to appreciate their military abilities at the time of his flight to them in 1256. It is interesting to note that at the battle of Pelagonia both sides – at least according to the *Chronicle of the Morea* – employed Turkish soldiers. The Greeks were probably the famous Bithynian archers.

¹¹⁸ See Pach., 54 ff. The Greek *Chronicle*, ed. Kalonaros, lines 4319-21, is the only source to mention Latin (Varangian) troops in any respect. It relates that when Villehardouin was captured at Pelagonia, he was taken before Palaeologos at Constantinople. (Actually, Palaeologos had not yet taken that city. R. Dawkins, in "The Later History of the Varangian Guard," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 37 [1947], 44, says this incident occurred right after Constantinople's recovery in 1261.) William defied his conqueror, whereupon the Emperor ordered his Varangians to return him to prison. Since this occurred *after* the battle, it is possible that these Varangians (if indeed Varangians), constituting as they did the imperial bodyguard, may have remained behind with the Emperor and not participated in the battle.

¹¹⁹ According to the Greek *Chronicle*, line 3711, the Nicene army included twenty-seven *allangia*: εἴκοσι ἐφτά εὑρέθησαν ἀλλάγγια καβαλλάριοι. An *allangion* was a detachment of troops nominally of the imperial bodyguard; its exact size is unknown. Cf. Acrop., 122, line 3.

¹²⁰ Acrop., 168, says of the allied forces: παμπληθὴς στρατιά. Michael Palaeologos wrote in his Autobiography, VII, 5: ὦν πολὺ μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κρείττον ἢ ὑριθμεῖν ῥαδίως; French *Chronicle*, ed. Longnon, pars. 273-274: "Si amassa toute sa gent de la Morée"; and "tant de gent que c'estoit merveilles a veoir."

have to forego hope of a purely military success and employ strategy aimed at weak links in the allied organization.

Preëminent among such weaknesses would be any disunity resulting from the antagonism of the Greek and Latin contingents and, to a much lesser degree, of the Germans of Manfred and the Franks. The attitude of the Greeks toward the Latins was affected by the hatred induced by the conquest of 1204, and by the racial and, above all, religious discrimination which they had endured during the years of Latin occupation.¹²¹ As in antiquity the Greeks still considered themselves superior to the Latins and on the whole looked upon them as supercilious,¹²² contemptible,¹²³ and heretical.¹²⁴ The Latin opinion of the Greeks, on the other hand, was even less complimentary. In general they regarded the Greeks as devoid of moral scruples,¹²⁵ hypocrites,¹²⁶ cowards,¹²⁷ and schismatics.¹²⁸ An alliance between two peoples so mutually antagonistic would hardly be firmly cemented. Such a situation was, of course, ideal for Michael Palaeologos, who was probably as subtle and intriguing a diplomat as Byzantium ever produced.

¹²¹ For example, one may cite a statement of Villehardouin, a Latin (Frankish) eyewitness of the conquest of 1204. He says that shortly after that time the Greeks on the big estates began to hate the Latins because of their bad conduct: "Le Grieci comencierent a hair et a porter malvais cuer" (*La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Faral, I [Paris, 1938] ch. 303, p. 112). An encomium written by Theodore II to his father, the Emperor Vatatzes, also speaks of Latin injustice toward the Greeks: τὴν λατινικὴν ἀδικίαν. Quoted in M. Andreeva, "Apropos de l'éloge de l'Empereur Jean III Vatatzes," *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, X (1938) 137-138.

¹²² Latin superciliousness was the quality most detested by the Greeks, at least to judge from the frequency with which it is mentioned in the sources. Gregoras, 96, speaks of τὴν Λατινικὴν ὀφρύν. Michael Palaeologos, in his Τυπικὸν . . . τοῦ Ἀρχιστρατήγου Μιχαήλ . . . *Opisanie liturgičeskikh rukopisej*, ed. Dmitrievskii (Kiev, 1895) 794, mentions "the stubborn and unbending neck" of the Latins: τὸν σιδηροῦν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκαμπὴ τράχηλον. Holobolos, *op. cit.*, 39, refers to the Latin nobles as τὴν ὀφρὺν γυροῦντες . . . περιφρονοῦντες τὴν γῆν.

¹²³ Probably the extreme in Greek vituperation against the Latins was reached by an anonymous author in describing the Latin conquest of 1204. He calls them "excrement of mucous": βαβαὶ τῆς μύξης. See in A. Mai, *Scriptores Veterum Nova Collectio*, II (Rome, 1826) p. xxxv.

¹²⁴ Mathew Panaretos, a contemporary of Palaeologos, wrote of τοῦ πονηροῦ δόγματος τῶν Λατίνων. (See in A. Demetracopoulos, *Graecia Orthodoxa* [Athens, 1872] 50.)

¹²⁵ The *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae et Lombardiae*, 48 (*Annales S. Justiniae Patavini*, 182), an Italian chronicle contemporary with Pelagonia, says of the Greeks: "morum probitate . . . denudati."

¹²⁶ A letter of Pope Clement IV dated June 9, 1267, refers to the frauds and lies of the Greeks: "eorum . . . fraudibus et mendaciis." In T. Ripolli and A. Bremond, *Bullarium Praedicatorum*, I (Rome, 1729) 485.

¹²⁷ Writing a few years after Pelagonia, the Primate, a French monk, called the Greeks "moulz de leur nature et paoureux avec." See Bouquet, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, XXIII (Paris, 1876) 73.

¹²⁸ The "Annales Parmenses Maiores," *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, XVIII (Hanover, 1863), for example, refer to "certis articulis fidei, in quibus errabant."

With regard to the outset of the battle, the sources differ. According to Acropolites, Michael Palaeologos had advised his brother John, presumably by dispatch, to avoid a head-on collision with the enemy and to attempt, by frequent and unexpected skirmishes, to exploit their lack of unity.¹²⁹ Therefore, as John approached the enemy troops in western Macedonia, he skillfully distributed his forces, assigning to his heavy-armed troops (catafracts) the task of occupying the strong mountain positions, while he deployed his lighter-armed and more mobile Cuman, Turk, and Greek archers in harassing the enemy on the plains with sudden attacks and withdrawals.¹³⁰

The vanguards of both armies met at Vorilla Longos.¹³¹ According to plan, the light-armed Nicene troops skirmished continually with the enemy, allowing them no respite by day or night. They attacked even their foes' horses while they were being watered and plundered their supply-trains. The confederate cavalry, constantly attacked on terrain with which it was unfamiliar, was thus gradually decimated and its supplies began rapidly to diminish. Finally Michael II's army, losing its morale, fled, arriving eventually at Prilep.¹³²

According to Gregoras, it was just before the flight of Michael II that John Palaeologos made an attempt to cause a rupture among the allies.¹³³ Encamping near the enemy, he secretly sent to Michael II at night a man pretending to be a deserter.¹³⁴ The man informed the Despot that his allies had made secret representations to the Nicene commander to betray the Despot for certain sums of money, and that the Despot's only hope of salvation lay in flight. Persuaded, the Despot fled before dawn with as many of his troops as he could immediately muster. The rest of his men drifted away during the night when they learned of his flight. In the morning the Latins of Manfred and William, realizing that Michael II had fled and believing themselves betrayed, also sought to flee, but not before the Nicenes had suddenly fallen upon them. Most of the Latins were killed; the rest were captured except for a few who escaped.¹³⁵

The account of Acropolites differs in that it makes no mention of treason. It records simply that the allied army was so decimated by the Nicene tactics

¹²⁹ Acrop., 168, line 19. Also compare the *Orationes* of Holobolos, 40, which state that the Emperor sent dispatches to his brother before the battle: διὰ γραμμάτων . . . θάρρους ἐνεπίμπλης. See also Hopf, *Geschichte*, 283.

¹³⁰ Acrop., 168, lines 17 ff.

¹³¹ According to R. L. Wolff, this is apparently a Vlach name.

¹³² Acrop., 169, line 22.

¹³³ See Gregoras, 74, lines 4–7. Cf. Hopf, *Geschichte*, 283.

¹³⁴ Gregoras, 74: ἀντομόλητος δῆθεν.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 74, lines 3–4.

that it lost all hope of victory, and that Michael II and Nikephoros, despairing, fled at night with the Epirot army. Whereupon the “Greek forces of the allies” (meaning probably the remaining Epirot forces) with their leaders and the Bastard John, went over to the enemy and took an oath of allegiance to the Nicene Emperor.¹³⁶ Acropolites says, furthermore, that Manfred’s four hundred Germans surrendered to only four Nienes. This statement, despite the skepticism of Dendias,¹³⁷ is not unreasonable if one of the four, as in fact was the case, was a top-ranking officer, the Grand Domestic Alexis Strategopoulos.¹³⁸ William and his troops scattered, but the Prince was captured at Kastoria, where he had hidden under a pile of hay. On discovery he was identified, according to Acropolites, by his protruding front teeth. Ansel de Toucy, Geoffrey of Karitana, and the other Frankish barons, totaling about thirty,¹³⁹ were taken nearby. They were then bound and led to the Emperor at Lampsakos.¹⁴⁰

The version of Pachymeres is strikingly different. He writes of discord arising among the allies before the battle and compares it to that which sprang up among the three goddesses contending for the golden apple.¹⁴¹ In the present case, dissension arose as a result of erotic glances cast at the beautiful Vlach wife of John the Bastard by knights from the army of Prince William of Achaia. Indignant at the insult to his honor, John threatened them; whereupon, in the words of the historian, “matters were inflamed to war and those summoned to fight as allies were drawn up against each other.”¹⁴² The strife soon came to the notice of William. Angered and unable (or perhaps unwilling) to punish his own men,¹⁴³ he taunted John the

¹³⁶ Acrop., 170, lines 5–8.

¹³⁷ Acrop., 170: *στράτευμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ῥηγὸς Σικελίας τοῦ Μαμφρέ . . . ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀνδρῶν κατεσχέθησαν*. Dendias, “Le Roi Manfred de Sicile,” *Mél. Diehl*, I, 56.

¹³⁸ Acrop., 170, line 23.

¹³⁹ The figure thirty is drawn from the hitherto overlooked contemporary source, the encomium already cited of Manuel Holobolos, 42: *ὁ τούτων πρίγκυψ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ βαρῶνες . . . ἄγχι καὶ τριάκοντα ἀριθμούμενοι*. The figure seems reasonable, since we know that all or practically all the Frankish lords were captured.

¹⁴⁰ Acrop., 170. Cf. Palaeologos’ so-called Autobiography (Troitzki, *Imperatoris Michaelis Palaeologi . . . opusculum*) 6, which reads that all without exception were captured.

¹⁴¹ Pachymeres, a great archaizer, often interpolated Homeric stores and grammatical forms.

¹⁴² Note that Pachymeres in this passage, 84, lines 17 and 19, uses both the words *πόλεμον* and *μάχην*. Generally speaking, these words mean “strife.” It is barely possible, however, that they could be here interpreted to indicate a judicial duel in the Western style, since (1) *πόλεμος* may mean duel in the Byzantine sources (as, for example, in the *Alexias* of Anna Comnena, I [Bonn, 1839] 243; ed. Reifferscheid, I [Leipzig, 1884] 168); (2) *μάχη* in Homer often denotes single combat, and Pachymeres, as noted, was fond of Homeric expressions; (3) Pachymeres’ phrase, *κατ’ ἀλλήλων συνίσταντο* (“they were drawn up against each other”) could mean they were preparing for a battle or a judicial duel; (4) finally, we know that the judicial duel was not unknown to the Byzantines at this time. See Acrop., 96.

¹⁴³ Why he could not punish his own men is not explained.

Bastard for his illegitimate birth, reproaching him that he was not freeborn like his brother Nikephoros but “baseborn like a slave.”¹⁴⁴

Furious at the insult, John plotted revenge. Like another Achilles, says Pachymeres, he decided to emphasize his importance to the allied army by showing that whichever side he supported would prevail. Thereupon dispatching a secret communication at night to John Palaeologos, he informed him that he would desert the coalition and join in an assault on the “stupid and effeminate Italians” and “especially on the men of the Prince . . . if only an attack would be made upon them.”

At the specific request of the Bastard, John Palaeologos solemnly pledged that no harm would befall his father the Despot or his brother Nikephoros.¹⁴⁵ Just before the battle, therefore, the Bastard persuaded them to withdraw. Then suddenly the Nicene troops fell upon the Latins, attacking from the front while the forces of John the Bastard assaulted from the rear. Great carnage resulted.¹⁴⁶ Realizing that they were betrayed, the Latins attempted to flee but were unable to escape, and many were killed or captured by the swift Cumans and Turks. William himself, discovered hiding behind a shrub, was taken prisoner.¹⁴⁷ Strangely enough, Pachymeres does not mention the fate of Manfred’s forces, which by his own testimony totaled three thousand men.

A contemporary Byzantine source for the battle, hitherto neglected, is the *Orationes* of Manuel Holobolos, court orator to Michael Palaeologos. Excessively rhetorical, as is to be expected for an encomium delivered before the court, Holobolos’ work nevertheless has value. In certain respects it corroborates accounts of the other sources; elsewhere it provides an occasional bit of new information. But perhaps its chief importance for this battle lies in its vivid expression of Nicene exultation at the humbling of the Epirot and, especially, Latin adversaries.¹⁴⁸ Holobolos in bold colors

¹⁴⁴ Pach., 85: *εἰς γένος ὡς νόθος, λίαν λαμπρῶς ὀνειδίσαι*. C. Lebeau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, XVIII (Paris, 1835) 67, misinterprets this passage, I believe, in asserting that it was instead the Despot who taunted his own son John with these words. Michael II may well have been angry at John for disrupting the alliance, but it seems extremely unlikely that he would have called him a bastard, especially since he himself was one.

¹⁴⁵ For the entire passage see Pach., 85, lines 6–14.

¹⁴⁶ Pach., 85, lines 18–22. What gives Pachymeres’ story credibility is: (1) the unusualness of the story, which makes it difficult to believe that it is a fabrication; and (2) the retreat of John the Bastard with John Palaeologos *after* the battle, a fact which is confirmed by all the Greek sources. If some such insult had not taken place, there would have been no motive for the Bastard to abandon his father. From the Bastard’s subsequent desertion of John Palaeologos and return to his father, it is evident that his original defection was only a temporary expedient to take revenge on William.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 85. Cf. Acrop., 170, line 10, according to which William was found under a heap of hay.

¹⁴⁸ *τὴν περιφανῆν νίκην . . . βροντῶντες ταῖς ἀπειλαῖς . . . λεγέτω τὸν περιφανῆ θρίαμβον*

describes the scene of the bloody battlefield littered with the corpses of thousands of Latins,¹⁴⁹ and skillfully depicts the plight of the thirty once haughty and now wretched Latin nobles as they are marched in chains to Salonika.¹⁵⁰

In addition to the Byzantine sources, there are three important Western accounts of this battle. First is the already mentioned *Chronicle of the Morea*, which is preserved in four versions, Greek, French, Italian, and Aragonese. Of these, the Greek and French alone have any really independent value, since the other versions are based upon them.¹⁵¹ The Greek, which was the first to be written (*ca.* 1300), is somewhat more detailed than the French in its description of Pelagonia and the events leading to it. It contains a long excursus on the battle proper which differs significantly from the Byzantine accounts. Moreover, it provides considerable information mentioned likewise only in the French *Chronicle*, as, for example, that Palaeologos received the aid of German, Serb, Bulgar, and Hungarian auxiliaries, and that William imposed upon his lands a general levy of troops for the campaign.

The Greek *Chronicle* alone indicates the meeting places for the troops of William, the Despot, and all the allied forces. More important, it exposes the ambitions of William to take Salonika and even all of Romania. Nevertheless, it has badly twisted the names of certain persons appearing at the battle. (The reason for this distortion is probably that it views events from the fourteenth century, its date of composition.)¹⁵² In this connection it records that the battle was primarily a struggle between Nikephoros and the Bastard (wrongly called Theodore) over the territory of their dead father. While Nikephoros secured the support of William, to whom he married his sister, the Bastard not only brought Michael Palaeologos to his side, but was even named commander of the Nicene forces. As such, the Bastard persuaded the Franks of his army's numerical superiority by displaying at night, on mountaintops lighted by fires, cattle gathered from nearby which appeared to be marching troops. Then he induced his brother Nikephoros to desert the Franks by sending a man to him who impressed

ἐκείνον τὸν πολυάνθρωπον, ὅταν . . . οἱ ἀλωθέντες ἐποφθησόμενοι ὄψεσιν, . . . οἱ ὠγύγιοι καὶ παρήλικες καὶ πρότριτα ἔλθοντες, ὅσα καὶ εἰς πυγμαίους ἢ νάνους . . . ἐπεστοιβάσθησαν μακρὰ κλαίοντες ἐλεῖνὰ στέναντες . . . (*Orationes*, ed. Treu, 39 and 41–42.)

¹⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*, 40: ἐξ αἱμάτων τραυματιῶν μύριαi κόρσαι Λατίνων ἀκόρσωτοι καὶ κεφαλοὶ ἀναύχενες ἔπεσον. . .

¹⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, 41: ἄχρι καὶ τριάκοντα . . . σὺν τοῖς σφῶν ἀρχοῦσι, πάντες κλοιοῖς σιδηρέοις καὶ σφυρηλάτοις πέδισαι ταῖς εἰρκτοῖς τῆς περιφανοῦς Θεσσαλονίκης.

¹⁵¹ See Longnon ed., *Chronique de Morée*, pp. xxxi–lxxxiv.

¹⁵² *Op. cit.*, pp. xxxi–xxxxiv.

upon him also the superiority of the opposing army.¹⁵³ As a result, Nikephoros fled with his troops, and the Franks and Moreot Greeks were left alone.¹⁵⁴ The Prince's forces were then attacked by the Bastard with the Nicene forces, which included Germans under the Duke of Karinthia.¹⁵⁵ The Franks put up heroic resistance, but were conquered by superior numbers. William and the Franks, reads the *Chronicle*, surrendered to avoid useless slaughter.

The French version differs very little from the Greek. It does, however, provide a few enlightening facts, as, for instance, that William and Nikephoros, dividing the prospective spoils before their campaign, assigned Salonika to William, and Vlachia to Nikephoros; and that their aim was to take all of Romania. The important passage concerning the betrayal of the allies is presented in the same way as that of the Greek version.

Critics often disregard the *Chronicle of the Morea* as a historical source, dismissing it as mere fantasy.¹⁵⁶ This attitude, of course, is justified in certain cases, as, for example, regarding information on the Greek states of Epirus and particularly of Nicaea, about whose affairs the *Chronicle's* Moreot authors were apparently not well informed. Discounting obvious errors and exaggerations, however, our knowledge would be much more fragmentary were we to reject all of the information it provides. If its material can be controlled by Byzantine or Latin sources, or if it provides, in particular, information about the Morea itself (about whose affairs the authors were presumably very well informed), there appears to be no valid reason to disbelieve its statements.

One more important source, also already mentioned, must be considered — the *Istoria del Regno di Romania* of Marino Sanudo Torsello. Although it is perhaps colored by a Venetian point of view, it is regarded by critics as more accurate than the *Chronicle of the Morea*.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, it contains important original material. It alone supplies the name of the territory in the dowry received by Prince William, and it alone alleges that William meditated dispossession of the Emperor Baldwin. Most important, Sanudo confirms Pachymeres' story of a Latin insult to the Bastard before

¹⁵³ At this point, line 3934, the author states that the Greeks should never be trusted: *ποτέ Ρωμαίων μὴ ἐμπιστευτῆς*.

¹⁵⁴ According to this account, when in the morning the Franks realized that the Despot had deserted them, they too wished to flee, but the Lord of Karitaina, their bravest knight, persuaded them (including William) to remain. Cf. Greek *Chronicle*, line 3832.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. *supra*, note 116.

¹⁵⁶ See Longnon ed., *Chronique de Morée*, p. xix. Hopf, *Geschichte*, 282, note 95, is of the opinion that events in the *Chronicle*, though often false are "doch nicht ohne Geschick und einen Anstrich von Wahrscheinlichkeit."

¹⁵⁷ Longnon ed., *Chronique de Morée*, p. xix.

the battle, remarking in addition that the offense led directly to the Greek betrayal of the Latins.¹⁵⁸

It is appropriate at this point to compare the accounts in order to establish the real cause for the collapse of the coalition. All the sources without exception report that the imperial army used some kind of stratagem to deceive its enemies. The Greek and French versions of the *Chronicle* agree with Gregoras that a spy, sent to the Epirot leader, brought about his desertion by persuading him of the numerical superiority of the imperial forces or of the supposed perfidy of his allies. Acropolites, who seems here less informed,¹⁵⁹ writes merely that the Despot's army, decimated by the Nicene tactics, fled, and that the Greek forces – meaning probably the remaining Epirots – and the Bastard deserted to the enemy.¹⁶⁰ None of these accounts in any important respect contradicts the version of Pachymeres – they are merely less complete. Acropolites, who is clearly anti-Latin and an apologist for Michael Palaeologos as well, may have sought to exalt the victory of his emperor and homeland without sullyng it by the mention of treachery.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, it seems strange that the Despot should apparently have been so easily duped by the Nicene commander and induced to flee. The motives for his flight are not difficult to understand, however, if we combine the account of Gregoras with that of Pachymeres, whose version is corroborated by Sanudo. Suspicious of his allies from the beginning, and fearing the loss of his own territory, the Despot probably became even more distrustful when he saw the arrival of the many powerful Frankish troops commanded by William. Even with the aid of Manfred's German forces (if the thesis is correct that the Despot and Manfred had made a secret agreement), plus the Vlach contingents of his son John, it was not certain that he could control the forces of William in case of a falling out.¹⁶² A serious conflict, in fact, now arose between his bastard son John and William, which did not portend at all well for allied success. Moreover, even if the allies should win the battle, it would not be

¹⁵⁸ Sanudo, *Istoria*, 107: "li Greci lo tradirono, e trà li altri suo Cognato Sevasto Cratora per offesa, che avea riceputo da Latini. . ." Although John the Bastard is here called Sebastocrator, he actually was given this rank only later by Palaeologos.

¹⁵⁹ Acropolites at this time was a prisoner of the Despot at Arta in Epirus, and was therefore not present at the battle. See Acrop., 164.

¹⁶⁰ Acrop., 170, lines 5–8.

¹⁶¹ Other examples of Acropolitan bias are his omission of any mention of Michael Palaeologos' responsibility for the murder of Muzalon during the revolution of 1258, which brought him to the throne, and his neglect to mention the important treaty of Nymphaeum (1261), in which Palaeologos gave many concessions to Genoa for its aid in the projected reconquest of Constantinople.

¹⁶² That the Despot's army was considerably smaller than that of his allies seems revealed by a passage in Gregoras, 71: πολλὰ πλεονεξία δ' ἔξωθεν αὐτὸν κατὰ συμμαχίαν προσελάμβανε.

too difficult for William, with the aid of the Frankish lords accompanying him (and possibly also of Baldwin), to deprive him of the spoils of victory and to strip him even of Epirus. On the other hand, if the allies should be defeated, as was likely after the Bastard's forces, numerically the greatest, had gone over to Palaeologos, the Despot knew all too well what his fate would be. He could not cope with William now, and the hatred of Latins and Greeks, already inflamed, made questionable the gaining of further advantages from the association. It would be more judicious therefore to flee, to carry on the struggle against Nicaea from his own territories, and, if possible, to secure additional aid from Manfred.

Thus Michael II fled at night with Nikephoros and as many Epirot troops as could be aroused without stirring the Latins. With his family he eventually escaped to the Ionian isles of Leukas and Kephallonia.¹⁶³ The morning after his flight, the combined attack of John Palaeologos and John the Bastard crushed Prince William and the remaining Latins. Afterwards the Bastard, remaining on the side of the Nicenes, marched with them to the sack of Latin Thebes. But there he deserted John Palaeologos to return to his father, Michael II.¹⁶⁴ The arrival of his son reinvigorated the Despot, and with his son's help, that of the faithful population of his homeland, Old Epirus, and renewed military aid from Manfred, he began to recoup his shattered fortunes, now fallen to their lowest point. Whether Manfred was angered at the Despot for his betrayal of the allied cause and the loss of the Sicilian troops is not recorded. If so, it was not for long, for not once but twice more within approximately a year and a half, Manfred provided him with troops. Thus the two maintained their alliance and, as is likely, their aspirations. With this aid special confirmation is added to the hypothesis of a secret agreement between the two rulers.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Acrop., 172: τὰς τε νήσους τὰς πέριξ καταγώγιον εἶχον Λευκάδα δηλαδὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν Κεφαλήνων. Situated off the coast of Old Epirus, Leukas (Santa Mavra) was still part of the Despotate, while Kephallonia belonged to Count Riccardo Orsini, cousin of the Despot. See Γρατιανὸς Ζώρξης Αὐθέντης Λευκάδος, translated from the German of K. Hopf by J. Romanos (Corfu, 1870) 143.

¹⁶⁴ Acrop., 172: τὰς Θήβας ἐσκύλευσε . . . καὶ μετὰ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἀποδρὰς περὶ τὸν ἀποστάτην Μιχαὴλ τὸν πατέρα τούτου ἀπῆει. Cf. Palaeologos, Autobiography, VII, 6: τῆς Καδμείας ἐπέβην.

¹⁶⁵ Pach., 89: πέμψας πρὸς Μαμφρὲ τοῦ τῆς Πουλίας ῥήγα . . . καὶ πλείστην συμμαχίαν λαβὼν. See also Pach., 137, and Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di Re Manfredi," 34. A passage in Spinelli, *Annali* (ed. Vigo-Dura) 43 (ed. Del Re, 641), informs us that Nikephoros, son of Michael II, on December 3, 1259, went personally to Italy to see Manfred and the Pope: "A li 3. di Diciembro, 1259, venne lo Piscopo [Del Re ed., "Dispoto"] de la Morea, ch'era caenato de Rè Manfredo, e sbarcaie a Vieste, e passaie a trovare lo Papa pe metterence pace tra lo Papa, e lo Rè" (cf. *supra*, note 87). The purpose of the journey apparently was to reconcile Manfred and the Papacy, and thereby to obtain aid for Epirus against Palaeologos. (Before examining the passage in question, it should be noted that the German W. Bernhardt, supported by B. Capasso, has attacked the chronicle as a forgery based on Villani [See *Matteo di*

On the basis of the above analysis it seems justifiable to affirm that the immediate cause of the allied debacle at Pelagonia was the defection of Michael II and John the Bastard. The underlying cause which rendered a rupture almost inevitable, however, was the profound enmity and suspicion existing between Greeks and Latins, which were manifested in a Latin insult to the Bastard and in the Despot's willingness to believe that his Latin allies were about to play him false. Vivid evidence of Greco-Latin antipathy is provided, appropriately enough, by Michael Palaeologos himself, who, in describing this very battle, declares of the Latins: ". . . greater than their number was their insolence and audacious disdain, but surpassing even this was their hostility and hatred for us."¹⁶⁶ In view of such pronounced antagonism, however rhetorically expressed, it is little wonder that the coalition collapsed.

Pelagonia was one of the most important battles of the thirteenth century, possibly of the entire later period of Byzantine history.¹⁶⁷ Had the

Giovenazzo, eine Fälschung des XVI. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1868)]. It has been supported as authentic, however, by the Italians G. Del Giudice and Minieri Riccio. On the controversy see *Enciclopedia Italiana*, XXXI, 376.) Regarding the passage cited from Spinelli, it is true that there is apparently no other record of a visit at this time by Nikephoros to the Curia. On the other hand, the passage cannot be attacked on the grounds that Spinelli's bestowal of the title of Despot on Nikephoros is inaccurate, since Nikephoros was given that rank by Theodore II Lascaris at the time of his marriage to Theodore's granddaughter (see Acrop., 134). There is, furthermore, nothing remarkable about an appeal of Michael II to the Papacy, since, some years later, perhaps Michael II and definitely his sons Nikephoros and the Bastard did enter into an alliance with the Papacy and Charles of Anjou (see *Archivio Storico Italiano*, XXV (1877) 181 and J. Gay, *Registres de Nicolas III* (Paris, 1898) no. 384, p. 135A). Finally, in support of the passage, we may cite more of a neglected passage in Pachymeres, 89, which reveals that Michael sought for and received additional aid of troops from Manfred at this time, which he handed over to his son Nikephoros: πέμψας πρὸς Μανφρὲ τοῦ τῆς Πουλίας ῥήγα καὶ πλείστην συμμαχίαν λαβὼν, παραδίδωσι τὰς δυνάμεις τῷ ὑπὸ αὐτῷ Νικηφόρῳ. Although one may wonder at Nikephoros' command of Manfred's troops, this can be attributed to the understandable reluctance of Manfred to entrust them again to Michael II after the latter's flight from the field at Pelagonia. The result of this collaboration was the victory at Trikorpyphos (1260), where Epirus, aided presumably by the troops of Manfred, defeated the army of Michael Palaeologos. Michael II recovered Old Epirus, and Manfred, as we are told by Pachymeres, 137, lines 17 ff. "usurped large areas of the Illyrias and New Epirus." On this see the article of P. Alexander, "A Chrysobull of the Emperor Andronicus II," *Byzantion*, XV (Boston, 1941) 194.

On the basis of the above evidence and arguments, it seems that we can, tentatively at least, accept the truth of this passage in Spinelli and perhaps even add a bit of additional weight to the arguments in favor of the work's authenticity. As for the victory of Trikorpyphos, although it aided Michael II to recover some of his territory and prestige, it detracted little from the importance of Pelagonia. Macedonia remained in the hands of Nicaea, Manfred's aid to the Despot being insufficient to alter the situation in Greece fundamentally.

¹⁶⁶ Autobiography, VII, 5.

¹⁶⁷ Gardner, *Lascaris*, 248, writes, "It is the larger result of the battle that entitles it to rank as a decisive one in the history of Western Europe." The *Chronicon Marchiae Tarvisinae*,

Latins and west Greeks been victorious and maintained their coalition, it could easily have meant the end of Nicaea and thus a long postponement of a Greek recovery of Constantinople. For William and the Frankish feudatories could presumably have turned successfully on the weaker Michael II and defeated him. They might then have taken Constantinople from Baldwin, or, as is more likely, have supported him and thereby infused new life into the Latin Empire. But the unnaturalness of the alliance and the deep-seated antipathy between Greeks and Latins did not permit this. Instead, at the crucial moment, the Greeks deserted their rivals.

The resulting defeat of the allies had grave consequences for Greco-Latin relations. It marked the beginning of the decline of Latin supremacy in Greece by giving Nicaea a firm foothold in the Morea.¹⁶⁸ It brought to the brink of ruin Epirus, Nicaea's rival for hegemony over the Greeks. Most important, Pelagonia paved the way for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire by removing the menace of a Latin attack from the west, thus freeing the hands of Michael Palaeologos for the task of recovering Constantinople.¹⁶⁹

47 (*Annales S. Justinæ Patavini*, 181), records the following of the defeat: "Guilmum Francigenam principem Bithinie, sibi cum exercitu feliciter occurrentem, gravio prelio superavit, ipsumque vivum capiens, in carcere tenebroso reclusit, sperans per ipsum totam terram principatus eius leviter obtinere."

¹⁶⁸ Michael Palaeologos secured from William of Achaia, as the price of the latter's release from captivity, the four strongest forts of the Morea: Mistra, Mani, Monemvasia, and Geraki. These constituted the nucleus for the formation of the Byzantine Despotate of the Morea. See Pachymeres, 77-78, and D. Zakythinos, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée* (Paris, 1932) 15-25. Zakythinos' work thoroughly analyzes the treaty of Constantinople (following the battle of Pelagonia) and its implementation. Regarding the importance of Pelagonia for Nicaea, Sanudo, *Istoria*, 114, writes the following: "Essendo Prigion il Principe Guglielmo, le forze de' Greci s'accrebbero mirabilmente e massime di Sir Michiel Paleologo."

¹⁶⁹ Odoricus Rainaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, III, a. 1260, § liv (Lucca, 1748) 68, has this to say of the victory: "Afflixit ea clades in Graecia Latinorum res adeo, ut Palaeologus in spem occupandae Constantinopolis elatus vires omnes dolosque ad eam sibi subiiciendam instruxerit."

APPENDIX A

PELAGONIA OR KASTORIA?

The problem of naming this battle, referred to by modern scholars as both Pelagonia and Kastoria, is complicated by the fact that these names were applied to cities¹ as well as to separate and distinct provinces.² Regarding the location of the battle, the important evidence is the following: (1) The Greek *Chronicle of Morea* states that it took place *στὰ μέρη τῆς Πελαγονίας*;³ (2) The French *Chronicle*, that it occurred “au plain de Pelagonie”;⁴ (3) Acropolites, finally, records that hostilities began at Vorilla Longos,⁵ a place apparently situated in the neighborhood of the town of Pelagonia.⁶ Taking into consideration these three references to Pelagonia, in addition to another passage in Acropolites revealing that Prince William of Achaia was captured at Kastoria after fleeing *away* from the battle site,⁷ it would appear that the battle was fought within the province of Pelagonia and not at Kastoria.

The exact locale of the action, however, seems difficult to specify, given the scantiness and vagueness of the sources.⁸ Nevertheless, on the basis of Acropolites' statement that hostilities began at Vorilla Longos (located, as mentioned, near the city of Pelagonia), and, furthermore, since the town of Pelagonia was a key point on the Via Egnatia,⁹ a road almost certainly used by both armies during the campaign,¹⁰ it seems justifiable to state that the battle took place in the neighborhood of the city of Pelagonia within the province of the same name. In conclusion, therefore, it seems more correct to refer to the action as the battle of Pelagonia than as that of Kastoria.

¹ For example, Acrop., 167, lists Pelagonia with other towns: Πρέσπα, Πελαγονία, Σωσκός, Μολυσκός. For Kastoria, see Acrop., 140, line 4.

² See the Chrysobull of Alexis III, dated 1198, in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, I (Vienna, 1856) 260, 263. Cf. the *Partitio Romanie* of 1204, *ibid.*, 486–487: “Provintia Prilapi et Pelagonie cum Stano,” and “Provintia Castorie.” See also D. Zakythinos, “Μελέται περὶ τῆς διοικητικῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπαρχιακῆς διοικήσεως ἐν τῷ Βυζαντινῷ κράτει,” *Ἑπετηρίς Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, XVII (Athens, 1942) 19 and 26.

³ Ed. Kalonaros, line 3695.

⁴ Ed. Longnon, par. 278.

⁵ Acrop., 169, lines 6–7.

⁶ This is the opinion of N. Kalomenopoulos, a specialist in Byzantine military history. See his article in *Μεγάλη Ἑλληνική Ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια*, VII (Athens, 1929) 553.

⁷ Acrop., 170, lines 9–11.

⁸ Pachymeres and Gregoras provide no definite evidence on the location of the battle.

⁹ On this see K. Miller, *Itineraria Romana* (Stuttgart, 1916) 521, and T. F. Tafel, *Via militaris Romanorum Egnatia* (Tübingen, 1841) 38–40. The city of Pelagonia was also known as Heracleia and today is called Bitolye (Monastir). As for Kastoria, it was situated on a spur of the Via Egnatia, extending south of the town of Pelagonia. See Miller, 521, and F. Schneider, “Eine Quelle für Manfreds Orientpolitik,” *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXIV (1932–33) 121.

¹⁰ All, or almost all, toponymics mentioned in the sources seem to be situated on or near the Via Egnatia.

APPENDIX B

ANSEL DE TOUCY OR ANSEL DE CAYEUX?

AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY ACROPOLITES' DISPUTED "ASEL"

Among the large number of Latin prisoners captured at Pelagonia was a Frankish knight known to us only as "Asel." In contrast to other captives who were long retained in prison, "Asel" was at once released on his promise that he would betray Constantinople to the Emperor Michael Palaeologos at the first opportunity. "Asel," it seems, was a kinsman of Michael, and as vassal of the Latin Emperor Baldwin — presumably an important and trusted one — he had charge of the keys to a certain gate of the city where his house was situated. It was through this entrance that he promised secretly to admit the forces of Palaeologos.¹

The identification of "Asel" poses a problem which has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The only contemporary writers to mention the intended treason, the Greek historians George Acropolites and Theodore Scutariotes, cite him simply as "Asel."² And of these two sources, the text of Acropolites, upon which that of Scutariotes is based,³ unfortunately contains a lacuna in a critical passage.⁴

Modern scholars have sought to identify "Asel" with Ansel de Toucy or Ansel de Cayeux, nobles of the Latin Empire, who are the only ones bearing the name of "Asel" (Latin, "Ansel" or "Anselm") to appear in the sources at this time.⁵ Scholarly opinion, however, has split almost evenly in its predilection for one or the other, and a final solution of the problem is therefore to be desired.⁶

¹ Acrop., 174: τοῦ ἐξαδέλφου αὐτοῦ, οὗ τὸ ὄνομα Ἀσέλ . . . αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ τείχει τῆς πόλεως τὴν οἰκίαν ἔχει καὶ πύλας ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῦ δεσποζόμενας, δι' ὧν δύναται ἂν τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατεύματα ἔνδον τῆς πόλεως ἀποφῇ καὶ δίχα μάχης εἰσαγαγεῖν . . . τὸ τε γὰρ συγγενὲς φαντασίαν ἐδίδου τοῦ ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ πλείονων τε τιμῶν καὶ δωρημάτων ὑποσχέσεις ἐνωμότους λαβόντα [lacuna] Φράγγων ἐν τῇ τοῦ πρίγκιπος Ἀχαΐας μάχῃ καὶ προσδοκήσας δεινὰ μάλιστα ἡμιοιρῆκει πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅτε καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποσχέσεις τῷ βασιλεῖ δέδωκε καὶ τὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντεδέξατο.

² Acrop., 174; Scutariotes, 546, line 30.

³ For Scutariotes' dependence on Acropolites, see G. Moravcsik, *Byzantino-turcica, Die byzantinischen Quellen der Geschichte der Türkvolker* (Budapest, 1942) I, 330.

⁴ Acrop., 174, line 12. A MS. cited by A. Heisenberg (*Georgii Acropolitae Opera*, I [Leipzig, 1903] 174, critical apparatus for line 12) as F (Cod. Parisinus of the fifteenth century) fills the lacuna as follows: καὶ τῷ συνέιναι τε τὴν μητέρα τοῦτου τῷ βασιλεῖ, etc. On this reading see Heisenberg's article "Studien zu Georgios Akropolites," *Sitzungs. der bayer. Akademie der Wissen.* (1899) 500–501, where he acknowledges its importance "für die ganz Textkritik." Nevertheless, in his definitive edition of Acropolites' text, dated 1903, Heisenberg discards the reading, probably because its significance is lessened by the number of more important MSS. which omit the reading. Actually even if the reading of F is accepted in the text, it will be seen that it does not contradict the thesis offered in the present article. Cf. *infra*, note 17.

⁵ In the account of Acrop., 41 and 170, the two men are called Ἀσὲλ δε Κάε and Ἀσὲλ δε Τουσί.

⁶ Heisenberg, without adducing evidence, assumes that "Asel" is Toucy (see index, 365 under Toucy: "liberatus portas Constantinopolis se aperturum esse

Ansel de Toucy, as we learn from the *Chronicle of the Morea*, was born and raised in Romania⁷ and spoke fluent Greek and Turkish.⁸ His mother was a half-Greek noblewoman, whose parents were the famous Greek archon, Theodore Vranas, and Agnes, sister to Philip Augustus, King of France.⁹ His father was Narjot de Toucy and his brother Philip de Toucy, both of whom had served as *Bailli* of the Latin Empire.¹⁰ That Ansel de Toucy was present at the battle of Pelagonia is attested by both Acropolites and Scutariotes.¹¹ Significantly enough, Ansel probably lived in Constantinople sometime after this battle, for we find that at the time of the Greek reconquest in 1261, he fled the city with Baldwin to Achaia. There he remained with other fugitive Latin barons awaiting the Emperor's return from the West where he had gone to seek aid.¹² Entering the service of his former brother-in-law, the Prince of Achaia,¹³ Toucy became his trusted lieutenant and performed signal service during the Prince's subsequent struggles with Palaeologos for the Morea.¹⁴ Toucy later went to Naples, but was sent back to Achaia to aid William by Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily, who had named him captain of his fleet.¹⁵

As for the background of Ansel de Cayeux (his family according to Du Cange¹⁶ came from Picardy), the place of his birth seems not recorded. Nor is anything significant known of his early career, except that in 1237, after the death of the Latin Emperor John of Brienne, he was named *Bailli*, thus achieving the Empire's highest rank except

pollicetur"). Chapman, *Michel Paléologue, restaurateur de l'empire byzantin*, 40, and J. Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, 226, concur, but like Heisenberg offer no proof. Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, 260, writes "vielleicht Anseau de Toucy," thus sharing the opinion of W. Miller, *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV (New York, 1927) ch. 16, p. 509. Those supporting Cayeux are Diehl, *L'Europe orientale de 1081 à 1453*, 184, who states that Palaeologos counted on Cayeux to betray Constantinople "sous le prétexte qu'il était vaguement allié à lui"; Meliarakes, *Nicaea*, 551; Buchon, *Recherches et matériaux pour servir à une histoire de la domination française* (Paris, 1840) pt. I, 178; and Gardner, *Lascarids*, 251, note 1, who tentatively identifies "Asel" with Cayeux. R. Wolff, "Latin Empire," 653, writes that it was "perhaps Anseau de Cahieu, perhaps Anseau de Toucy, perhaps neither." The more general histories of Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (Munich, 1952), and Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1952), make no mention of this incident.

⁷ Greek *Chron.*, line 5241: ἐκ τῆν Ῥωμανίαν ἀνθρωπος παιδευμένος. Also French *Chron.*, par. 357: "Ancelin de Tucs . . . fu nés et norris en Romanie," and 358: "il estoit dou pays de Constantinople."

⁸ Greek *Chron.*, lines 5231 ff.: ἤξευρεν καλὰ τὴν γλῶσσαν τῶν Ῥωμαίων, and lines 5442 ff.: κ' ἤξεύρεις καὶ τὰ Τούρκικα.

⁹ See Du Cange, *Histoire de l'empire de Constantinople* (ed. Buchon) 74.

¹⁰ Greek *Chron.*, line 5411 and note. Also Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, 182 and 185; and Du Cange, *op. cit.*, 74.

¹¹ Acrop., 170: Ἀσὲλ δε Τουσί, ὁ τῆς Καριτάνας Ἰοφρὲ καὶ ἄλλοι . . . ἐάλωσαν. Also Scutariotes, 544.

¹² Greek *Chron.*, lines 1320 ff.

¹³ William's first wife was the sister of Ansel de Toucy. See F. Cerone, "La Sovranità Napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine," *Arch. Stor. per le Prov. Nap.*, XLI (1916) 11.

¹⁴ Greek *Chron.*, line 5231 ff. In line 5646, William says to Toucy, πολλὰ ἐποικες διὰ ἐμένα. See also line 5651 where William addresses Toucy as φίλε καὶ συγγενῇ μου.

¹⁵ C. Minieri Riccio, *Alcuni Fatti riguardanti Carlo I di Angiò dal 6 di Agosto 1252 al 30 di Dicembre 1270* (Naples, 1874) 120 and 87, note.

¹⁶ Du Cange, *Familiae Byzantinae* (Paris, 1680) 220.

for that of Emperor. His wife, it should be noted, was the daughter of Theodore I Lascaris, Greek Emperor of Nicaea.¹⁷ Although evidence is lacking that Cayeux was present at Pelagonia, he probably was in Constantinople at the time of its capture in 1261 and fled the city with Baldwin's entourage. At any rate, we know that in 1269 he was residing at the court of Charles of Anjou,¹⁸ who had gathered around him many of the surviving barons of the Latin Empire.

The principal objection to the identification of Toucy with "Asel" is that there is no evidence whatsoever in Toucy's background to bear out Acropolites' statement that "Asel" was a cousin (ἐξάδελφος) to Palaeologos.¹⁹ Though unrelated to Michael, Toucy was, it should be stressed, half Greek, since his father, as mentioned, had married the daughter of Theodore Vranas, Greek lord of Adrianople.²⁰

In the case of Ansel de Cayeux, however, definite evidence does exist of relationship to Palaeologos. Cayeux was Michael's second cousin through marriage, since his wife was the daughter of Theodore I Lascaris, whose mother was the sister of Palaeologos' grandmother.²¹ The term ἐξάδελφος in the strict sense was applied only to blood relatives, but we know that according to common Byzantine usage many similar terms were used in a broader sense.²² In this case, therefore, the term in question might possibly refer to Cayeux's distant kinship with Palaeologos. In view of the complicated array of marriages in both Toucy and Cayeux families, and the additional fact that members of both families had held the position of *Bailli* in the Latin Empire, it would not be at all surprising if Acropolites (as a Greek he was perhaps not entirely familiar with Latin affairs) had confused the two men.²³

It is evident from Acropolites' account that his "Asel" never really intended to betray Baldwin and that he suggested — or approved — the projected treason solely as a means of securing his freedom. Indeed, Acropolites affirms quite emphatically —

¹⁷ Acrop., 41, line 5: τῇ θυγατρὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Θεοδώρου τοῦ Λασκάριος συνεζύγη. Cf. with MS. F (*supra*, note 4) where it is stated that "Asel" *himself* was related to Michael through his mother.

¹⁸ See Cerone, *loc. cit.*, 208, for a document which mentions the dowry given by "Anselino de Cazeu Camerario Imperii Romanie" (undoubtedly Cayeux, as Cerone, *loc. cit.*, 208, points out) to the betrothed of his daughter. It consisted in part of territory "quam habet in Romania, postquam ipsam Terram de manu Sismaticorum et inimicorum recuperabit." Cf. Sanudo, *Istoria di Romania*, 128 and note 3. Cayeux (sometimes spelled "Cahieu") should not be confused with Anselm de Chau (also "Chaus" or "Chaus"), a French knight who apparently had little or no connection with the Latin Empire. Chau was related to the Serbian Queen, Helen, and was in 1273 named captain-general of Albania by Charles of Anjou. On Chau and Cayeux see C. Jireček, "Staat und Gesellschaft in Mittelalterlichen Serbien," III, *Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophische-Historische Klasse*, vol. 58 (1914) 36, and note 5. Also cf. L. De Thallóczy, C. Jireček, and E. De Sufflay, *Acta et Diplomata Res Albaniae Mediae Aetatis Illustrantia*, I (Vienna, 1913) no. 308; and G. Del Giudice, "La Famiglia di re Manfredi," *Arch. Stor. Prov. Nap.*, V (1880) 303.

¹⁹ 174: τοῦ ἐξαδέλφου αὐτοῦ.

²⁰ See *supra*, note 9, and Longnon, *L'Empire latin*, 220.

²¹ Du Cange, *Histoire*, I (ed. Buchon) 340–341. Cf. *supra*, note 17.

²² On the Byzantine use of terms of relationship see St. Binon, "A Propos d'un prostagma inédit d'Andronic III Paléologue," *Byz. Zeit.*, 38 (1938) 146 ff.

²³ Du Cange, *Histoire*, I, 341, also had suspected confusion of the two men's names.

and not a little caustically – that Palaeologos was duped by “Asel.”²⁴ That Toucy possessed craftiness of character is evident from a passage in the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* which describes how Toucy at the battle of Prinitza in 1263 proposed to the Prince of Achaia a ruse, the adoption of which aided materially in crushing the forces of Palaeologos.²⁵

If we are to identify “Asel” with Cayeux, we must, in accordance with Acropolites’ statement about the capture of “Asel,” assume Cayeux’s presence at the battle of Pelagonia. One finds difficulty, however, in explaining the appearance of this important personage and former chief minister of the Latin Empire.²⁶ Baldwin, as we have seen, had thought it wise to be dissociated from affairs of the Achaian-Sicilian-Epirot coalition, and therefore had held aloof from events leading up to and including the battle.²⁷ Even if Cayeux’s presence at Pelagonia is to be granted, however, it is extraordinary that his name, at least as important as that of Toucy, was not mentioned by any of the Byzantine or Frankish accounts along with those of William of Achaia, Toucy, and other captured Frankish lords.

The presence and capture of Toucy, on the other hand, is explicitly confirmed by both Acropolites and Scutariotes.²⁸ His appearance would not have embarrassed Baldwin, since he lacked the prestige of Cayeux. Furthermore, his presence may be plausibly explained by his relationship to his brother-in-law, William of Achaia. On the contrary, no such case can be made for the presence of Cayeux at Pelagonia. More than likely, Cayeux was at the time in Constantinople, whence later at the Greek reconquest he escaped to the West with Baldwin, Toucy, and others.

Important in the projected betrayal of the capital is the question of motive. Regarding Toucy, it is easy to assume that he would merely be buying his freedom, since we are informed that “Asel” had been captured and then released by Palaeologos, who bestowed upon him rich gifts and a promise of future rewards.²⁹ In the case of Cayeux, however, if we assume that he was absent from Pelagonia, a reasonable motive for treason seems to be lacking. He had already achieved the pinnacle of office in Latin Constantinople, and it is doubtful if he could have attained higher honors under Greek domination. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Palaeologos, shrewd diplomat that he was, could have taken seriously an agreement of Cayeux to betray Constantinople if the latter had no important benefit to gain from a Greek restoration.

One more source, the fourteenth-century *Chronography* of the Byzantine Ephraim (hitherto apparently overlooked), must be considered. It states explicitly that it was

²⁴ 174: ἡπάτα καὶ γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα.

²⁵ Greek *Chron.*, lines 5341 ff., and cf. Zakythinos, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, 40. Toucy aided in securing the defection of Palaeologos’ Turkish mercenaries to the Latins and in leading the Turks in the trap which they set for the Greek troops. Longnon, *L’Empire latin*, 226, writes of Toucy: “Élevé au milieu des Grecs était devenu aussi ruse qu’eux-mêmes.”

²⁶ He had been *Bailli* (regent) in 1237–1238. See Longnon, *op. cit.*, 182. On the attitude of the Greeks toward his rank, see Pach., 318, line 1, who speaks of him as “Megas Kyr” in Constantinople.

²⁷ For an analysis of Baldwin’s attitude, see main article, text for notes 62–76.

²⁸ See note 11, *supra*.

²⁹ Acrop., 174: καὶ τὸ πλείονων τε τιμῶν καὶ δωρημάτων ὑποσχέσεις ἐνωμότους λαβόντα.

Ansel de Cayeux who promised to betray the city to Palaeologos.³⁰ Although this statement is unambiguous, Ephraim's testimony cannot be accepted as substantially supporting the case for Cayeux, since his work has been adjudged to have little if any independent value.³¹

In summary of the above reasoning, hypothetical as it must be in view of the sparseness of evidence, it seems more justifiable to identify Acropolites' cryptic "Asel" with Ansel de Toucy than with Ansel de Cayeux. In all likelihood Acropolites, by confusing the two men whose names and careers were similar, has himself misled scholars in mistakenly attributing to "Asel" — i.e., Ansel de Toucy — a kinship with Michael Palaeologos, an affinity which in reality existed between Palaeologos and Ansel de Cayeux.³²

³⁰ See ed. Bonn (1840), lines 9453–9454:

'Ανδρὸς Λατίνου κλήσιν 'Ασελδεκάε
Πόλιν προδῶσιν βασιλεῖ προφαιμένον.

³¹ See Krumbacher, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Litteratur* (Munich, 1897), and Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, I, 131, who affirms: "Selbständigen historischen Wert hat die Schrift nicht." Ephraim, who composed his work in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, carefully followed Acropolites for the period 1204–1261. It is entirely plausible, therefore, that in adding the surname of Cayeux to the "Asel" of Acropolites, Ephraim was misled into combining two statements of Acropolites: (1) that "Asel" was related to Michael Palaeologos, and (2) that Cayeux was related to Palaeologos. (See *supra*, note 1 and Du Cange, *Histoire*, I, 340–341.)

³² It is remarkable that the contemporary Italian chronicler, Thomas Tuscus (*Gesta Imperatorum et Pontificum*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, XXII [Hanover, 1872] 518), states that Constantinople actually was captured by Palaeologos through the treachery of a certain Frankish noble named Anselm ("proditione cuiusdam nobilis Gallici nomine Anselmi"). He has, of course, confused the unsuccessful attempt of Palaeologos to take the city by treachery with his later success in 1261. The account is interesting, however, for it reveals that the treasonable negotiations of "Asel," mentioned by the Byzantine sources, were known also in Italy. Curiously enough, Tuscus, very much like Acropolites, terms the protagonist simply "Anselm."